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Abstract
Mobile security is a vast research world with an ever-changing landscape. Researchers
develop security solution one day just to see them overcome a week later. Protocols
and specifications are generated that attempt to create order out of the chaos and
provide a clear roadmap to the future of mobile security. Unfortunately, that road
is often filled with switchbacks and U-turns as security measures are defeated and
researchers return to the drawing board.
Research conducted over the past four years has provided significant information
that can help to drastically alter the direction of mobile security and help it leapfrog
e↵orts made by hackers around the world. During this time, an analysis of modern mobile security research was conducted. The research presented also includes
research conducted on Physical Unclonable Functions and their impact to the world
of mobile security. Finally, a novel mobile security architecture has been developed
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that can provide stronger authentication, unique encryption of security-critical data,
and protection of sensitive information during transit between devices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In an article presenting results of a recent report from Cisco’s Global Mobile Data
Traffic Forecast, it was stated, “By the end of 2012, the number of mobile-connected
devices will exceed the number of people on Earth, and by 2016 there will be 1.4
mobile devices per capita.” [5] Further, in 2011, mobile data traffic was 8 times the
size of the entire global Internet in 2000. To say that mobile device usage is on the
rise today may be one of the greatest understatements of our age.
While the number of devices being used, combined with their respective data
usage, is in itself remarkable, the extent to which the devices are used is equally
astounding. Current predictions show anywhere from 44 to 183 billion mobile application downloads by 2015 [6] [7]. Many of these applications, also known as “apps”,
are providing account access for membership organizations, financial institutions,
email services, and much more. Unfortunately, the question of security during these
interactions is often being answered long after these services have been deployed.
Users typically have no understanding of how their data and personal information is transmitted to the necessary entities, or how it is handled on the mobile
device. A prime example of this is the recent disclosure that the iPhone mobile
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app for Southwest Airlines submitted a user’s username and password in plain text
over the Internet to their remote server [8]! This discovery was not found by the
application developers, but by a hacker performing random attacks on mobile applications. While the issue was eventually addressed and an update was provided, the
incident illustrates the fact that such issues are often discovered by normal users or
by members of the security community, and not by application developers.
Issues such as these lead one to question the very nature and extent of the security
provided by these mobile devices. However, such occurrences should not lead people
to believe that security is not a factor in the design of mobile devices. Security is,
in fact, one of the prime considerations by most device and software manufacturers
around the world.
A question that often comes up is, “why can’t we simply implement the same
security methods on mobile devices that already exist on our desktop systems?” In
order to answer this valid question, it is important to understand the vast di↵erences
between these two architectures.
Security for desktop systems is designed around the fact that information transfers happen via a limited number of controllable interfaces, i.e. networks and removable drives. While each of these provide the possibility for serious security issues, the
User has greater control over the functionality of these interfaces. For instance, if
users are concerned about network-based attacks, they can easily turn o↵ their wireless card or unplug their network cable. If they are concerned about the contents of
a specific CD or DVD, they can simply not insert the disk into their machine.
Users of mobile devices rarely have the same fine-grained control of their devices
as desktop users. The Short Message Service (SMS) used by mobile communication
networks to transmit small text messages between devices is not controllable by the
User. These messages are not only queued by the network in order to help ensure
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delivery, but are received whether the User requests them or not. Because of this,
SMS messages were used extensively in mobile attacks during the early 2000s, and
are still used today.
Another major di↵erence between desktop and mobile systems is the number of
entities that have a vested interest in the operating state of the device. For desktop
systems, the User is the owner of the entire system and has full control over what
software is loaded onto the system, as well as when and how it operates. If the
device is connected to a network and is found to be operating in a malicious manner,
network service providers may disable services, but otherwise have no control over
the device.
These controls, like the ones presented previously, are not the same for mobile devices. Operating System (OS) providers, third-party applications, service providers,
and device manufacturers all have a justifiable need to control one or more elements
on the device. A prime example is the baseband processor on a cellular device. This
processor is responsible for controlling the modem in order to ensure the device is
operating within the correct frequency spectrum to facilitate available communications mechanisms. A device manufacturer will typically control this in accordance
with requirements dictated by the service provider. Control of this process must be
available to the manufacturer, even after the user purchases the device.

1.1

Security Concerns in Embedded Systems

Due to the complexity of a system with multiple stakeholders, the idea of developing a
“one-size-fits-all” solution is at best problematic. Further, mobile devices, or cellular
devices as they are often called, are not the only hardware platforms that are in need
of protection. Embedded systems that rely upon the same type of processing elements
include healthcare systems, automotive computers, hand-held electronics, femtocell
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devices, and radio-frequency identification (RFID) equipment. Such devices often
utilize ARM core processors, similar to the ones used in the majority of smart phone
cellular devices. That being the case, solutions developed in the mobile world can
potentially have implications in various other arenas as well.

1.1.1

Automotive Security

In 2010 and 2011, Checkoway et.al [9] [10] demonstrated the ability to hijack the
computer system inside a number of automobiles. Most modern vehicles contain a
number of di↵erent computers, each with a variety of capabilities and responsibilities
in the overall operation of the automobile. An internal network is typically used to
connect these computers, allowing them to share information and work together to
control the vehicle. However, as demonstrated by the authors, these networks rarely
have any form of authentication built in, but rather assume that commands and
information received from any other computer is valid. The authors discovered that
on the vehicles tested, any computer on the network was able to re-write the firmware
of any other computer system. By gaining execution through the radio, On-STAR
system, or even just through the standard On-Board Diagnostic (OBD-II) terminal,
the attackers were able to unlock the car, disable the security system, turn the car
on/o↵, disable the brakes, and perform a variety of other safety critical actions.

1.1.2

Medical Security

Security concerns with medical devices are also starting to crop up. The United
States Government Accountability Office recently issued a report advocating the
need for greater security examination of medical equipment [11], likely prompted
by reports of successful hacks, such as that performed by Jerome Radcli↵e [12]. In
order to reduce costs and increase patient comfort, hospitals have begun network-
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ing medical equipment in order to allow doctors and nurses to make changes and
monitor conditions without having to enter a patient’s room. As with vehicular networks, there is often no authentication mechanism in place to prohibit an attacker
from connecting to the network and sending bogus commands to connected devices.
Further, there are serious privacy concerns in regards to an attacker being able to ascertain patient information and potential health issues by simply snooping a network
connection.

1.1.3

Mobile Infrastructure Security

Femtocells are a new device being pushed by mobile service providers as a method
for o↵-loading data usage loads on to landline based network connections. This has
been done in large part due to the acceleration in the use of smart-phone devices that
often consume what cellular provides consider “large” amounts of data. One of the
primary concerns with this approach is that an attacker is provided with access to a
resource that would normal be physically restricted, such as a cell tower. Researchers
demonstrated an exploit based upon this very concept in 2011 in which they were
able to monitor communications between the femtocell and the cellular network by
tapping the hard-wire network connection [13]. The researchers were also able to rewrite the firmware of the femtocell and gain access on a device that can inject data
directly into the cellular network, allowing them to send malicious and malformed
data packets to the cellular network backbone. This revealed a vast amount of user
information, including the locations of all femtocell devices in the entire country of
France!
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1.1.4

Mobile Device Theft

Theft of mobile devices also continues to be a problem today. Smart phones are
significantly more advanced than previous mobile devices and as such command a
much higher price on the black market. Users also tend to store much more personally identifiable information on these devices, such as contacts, email, credit card
information, membership club details, and many other such items. Depending on
the country, thieves are often able to simply remove the Subscriber Identification
Module (SIM) card from the phone and replace it with a new one. Once done, the
phone connects to the corresponding cellular network and continues to be usable.
Despite the use deterrents, such as black lists and International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI) numbers, attackers have found methods of circumventing these roadblocks and regaining access to the underlying device. Without a non-circumventable
method for associating a device with a specific user, this will continue to be a problem
for the foreseeable future.

1.2

Security Approaches

Problems such as these are currently being researched by an assortment of di↵erent
institutes delivering a potpourri of solutions. During this process, an analogy can
be made to a lake into which a variety of di↵erent rocks are thrown. The result is
chaos: waves of di↵erent sizes colliding and disrupting the beauty of the water. But
as time goes on, the waters calm and the waves dissipate, leaving the viewer with
a clear view of the lake. The conglomeration of these ideas into a simple, elegant
solution that can calm the waters is often where the real science is born.
Each solution that is developed or presented is typically tailored towards the
purposes of the originator and is not necessarily meant to provide an all-encompassing
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solution. This is not unexpected, nor is it a bad thing per say. However, it is left
of others to determine the proper methodology for merging these technologies into a
solution capable of addressing each of the concerns presented in Sec. 1.1. The three
primary questions that must be resolved by any proposed solution are: 1) How can a
family of devices that are all based o↵ the same design be protect in a unique method
that does not require di↵erences in design or maintaining massive data about each
device? 2) How can the mobile device be authenticated in a way that correlates a
device to a user on a specific network without being subject to alteration by malicious
software? and 3) How can the mechanisms developed to address these two question
be protected from both external and internal attacks on the device?

1.2.1

Device Originality

Device originality may not initially appear to address any of the issues presented
previously, but it is critical to authentication and true data protection. Changes in
the hardware design of chips result in significant financial costs and are therefore not
feasible as a method for device originality. This led to the use of the IMEI number
as a method for uniquely identifying each device. However, this number is not a
cryptographic key and has never been used for data protection. Further, this value
is generally read from software and then returned. Any malicious code running on
the device would have the potential to intercept such calls and manipulate this value.
Further, the IMEI number is often not protected in any way and is easily read even
by external software.
Most modern security solutions for desktop computing use public/private cryptographic key-pairs for uniquely identifying a device and ensuring that communications
received originated from the expected party. These key-pairs are created through a
special mathematical relationship that allows a message to be encrypted using one
key and then decrypted only through the use of the other key. In this situation,
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a client would encrypt a message using a server’s public key. The server, using its
private key, would be the only entity capable of decrypting the message. If the client
then receives a valid response from the server, it knows that it received the original
message and was able to decrypt it, thereby validating that the server is who it claims
to be.
Researchers over the past few years have identified the capability of generating
unique values that can be used for identification or key generation through the use of
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). A PUF generates unique-per-device values
by leveraging manufacturing di↵erences between chips. Even though chips may contain the exact same hardware designs, the fabric upon with the logic is constructed
has variations and defects that don’t directly alter the functionality of the underlying logic, but can be utilized to generate random values that are unique for each
device. This happens on each instance of the same chip, even for chips that are
manufacturer at the same time and same location under all the same conditions. As
a result, researchers have proposed their use in the generation of secret keys of use in
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) operations, as well as for random input into
public/private key pair generators [14] [15].
Implementing a PUF circuit does not require di↵erences in the hardware design,
yet still provides variable, non-deterministic values for each device, thereby fulfilling the necessary requirements. By creating a unique-per-device AES key, a PUF
enhanced design provides the capability to uniquely protect onboard data even on
devices with identical hardware architectures and data. Additionally, no information
about the key is required to be maintained o↵-chip.
A primary example of this is protection of device firmware. Transmission of
the firmware to the device utilizes a public/private key-pair, but in a somewhat
untraditional way. The server that maintains the firmware will encrypt the firmware
and then sign it using its own private key. This encrypted blob of data is then sent
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to the mobile device along with the server’s public key. In this case, the server is
not concerned with someone being able to capture this transmission and decrypt the
firmware, but is more concerned about proving to the devices that the packet is valid.
To support this approach, a mathematical operation known as a “hash” is performed on the public key, which results in a non-reproducible, and often smaller
value. This hash can be stored in non-volatile storage on the mobile device. When
the device receives the firmware update package from the server, it performs the
same hash on the received key. If the result of the hash matches what is in memory,
the device knows that the key is valid and has not been altered. It can then use
the key to verify the signature of the firmware package and decrypt the remaining
data. Once the data has been decrypted, it can then be re-encrypted using the
device-unique secret key and stored on the device. This provides a unique instance
of identical firmware on every device.

1.2.2

Device Authentication

The use of PUFs to generate a secret key and a public/private key pair also allows
designers to address the issue of device authentication. A normal cellular device uses
a SIM card to store user authentication information that is used to identify a user
to the network. This exchange has worked well for years, but does not provide any
association of the user to the actual device. In order to protect cellular networks, as
well as automotive and medical networks, a method must be used that can associate
the device itself to the network without being a↵ected by native code executing on
the device.
The use of a PUF generated value alleviates the ability of native code to simply
read the identification value or authentication (public/private) keys. When authentication is requested, the processor sends a command to a PUF enhanced crypto-
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graphic unit instructing it to provide an authentication value. In conjunction with
the SIM card, the cryptographic unit receives the authentication request and returns
the necessary response. All that software running on the device can do is ignore the
request, as it has no access to the authentication values. Doing so simply prohibits
the device from connecting to the network and provides no information to the native
code, malicious or otherwise.
The identity of the device can be done using a uniquely generated value, similar to
the IMEI, or it could simply make use of the public/private key-pair for identification.
For instance, consider an automotive network. The various computers on these
networks need the ability to communicate with one another. However, a mechanism
must exist for them to identify each other and know that received communications
are legitimate and are not be spoofed by an unknown entity on the network. This
problem can be solved using the public/private key-pairs.
When the automobile is first produced, the computer systems can be set in a
“discovery” mode. Using an external computer, an identification packet can be sent
to each automotive computer. This packet would contain the public key of the sending computer. The automotive computers then maintain this key by encrypting it
with their own secret key and then storing it in non-volatile memory. Each computer
can then also exchange public keys with all other computers in the automobile. Once
this process has completed, a command from the external computer can be sent to
move the computers from “discovery” mode to “operational” mode. At this point,
all communications between computers can be encrypted and identities can be validated based upon results stored during the “discovery” phase. If at any time a failure
occurs or another computer needs to be added/replaced, the dealer can implement
such a change by authenticating itself with the public key of the external computer
and place the automotive computers back into “discovery” mode.
While it would be possible to provide authentication using only the secret AES
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key, public/private keys are frequently used in RSA cryptographic operations in order to facilitate the exchange of secret keys. The reason for this is that public/private
keys provide strong identification properties but are computationally expensive, especially in terms of time. For this reason, it is customary to use public/private keys
only to establish a secure communications channel and to then exchange a symmetric
secret key that can be used for all further communications.

1.2.3

Device Defense

In order for PUF generated values to be protected from attacks, the first step is
access control. Values generated by the PUF are not required to be stored in nonvolatile memory. A PUF is capable of not only producing unique-per-device values,
but also doing so consistently. Each time the device boots, the PUF regenerates the
exact same values, which can then be latched, i.e. stored, into volatile storage. By
only maintaining these values in volatile storage, they will be erased each time the
unit reboots or otherwise loses power.
The PUF values can also be used indirectly rather than allowing direct access to
their contents. For instance, modern cryptographic units receive commands through
memory-mapped registers that can be access from both the cryptographic unit and
the main processor. The processor writes values to these memory locations that
tell the crypto unit what operation to perform, what key to use, and where to
get and store the necessary data. Then, through the use of a mux (a selectableoutput device), the PUF value can be selected as the key value for the corresponding
algorithm accelerator inside the crypto unit. This prevents the PUF generated values
from being directly accessible by the cryptographic unit or by any other device in
the system.
By using a PUF generated AES key, boot-loaders, i.e. firmware, used to load
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the operating system can also be protected in a unique manner. As mentioned
previously, these boot-loaders can be sent to the device encrypted, then decrypted
and re-encrypted with the device unique key. This results in identical firmwares being
stored uniquely on each device, thereby preventing an attacker from creating a single,
modified firmware and loading it on any device. The attacker would have to gain
access to the AES key for each device before they were able to directly overwrite the
firmware file. This helps to reduce the potential for attacks across an entire family
of devices and instead makes attacks much more local in scope.
While access to the PUF enhance cryptographic unit is required, it must be restricted in order to prohibit arbitrary usage by malicious code. Some encryption
algorithms are susceptible to what are called plain-text/cypher-text attacks wherein
information about the value of the key can be inferred by analysis of plain-text
and the resulting cypher-text. While there are no known plain-text/cypher-text attacks on AES, it may still be possible for an attacker to spoof identification if it is
provided unrestricted access to the crypto unit. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provides a mechanism for creating isolated execution environments
for trusted applications. Restricting access to the crypto unit only to applications
executing within the TEE will help absolve potential issues of identity spoofing. Further, any application executing with the TEE is assumed to be trusted and should
never act in a malicious manner that would re-open this possibility.
Additionally, a PUF enhanced cryptographic unit is capable of not only producing
a single AES secret key, but can generate hundred or thousands. In a traditional
approach where a secret key (or its hash) is stored in non-volatile storage, no known
method exist for modifying this value in the instance that the key is compromised.
Such values are often referred to as being “burned-in” meaning that once they are set,
they can only be partially changed and only with physical access to the device. By
contrast, if the secret key of a PUF enhanced architecture is ever compromised, the
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cryptographic unit can easily change to a new key. This can be done by decrypting
any secret key protected elements using the original key and then re-encrypting them
using a newly generated key. The crypto unit only needs to maintain information
about which PUF circuitry is used for key generation at the time. Because of the
nature of PUF circuits, such information provides no leakage of key values.

1.3

Research Objectives

The purpose of this research is to prove the viability of merging the various mobile
security solutions into a singular solution that is capable of addressing each of the
issues presented thus far. The novelty of this work comes not in the development
of a new architecture or tool, but in how existing capabilities can be conjoined to
provide enhanced mobile security. Specifically, this paper will explore the use of PUF
technology to support the assurance of provenance of device boot software in mobile
systems. Additionally, it will explore how PUF technology can support the concept of
unique device authentication, together with user authentication, on mobile networks.
Finally, it will detail how PUF technology can provide authenticated, private, nonreputable communication and protection of onboard data.
During this research, all of the modern mobile specifications and protocols, hardware and software security elements, as well as academic and professionally produced
solutions were considered. Through scientific analysis of the benefits and drawbacks
of each approach, a justification for the use of PUF technology has been founded
which addresses the dire security concerns of our modern world. Rather than simply presenting yet another “security feature”, the goal of this work is to discover if
a method exist for properly conjoining a number of these approaches into a single,
PUF-based implementable solution that can be easily adopted by manufacturers and
utilized by developers.
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The details of how this analysis was performed are contained in the remaining
chapters. In Chapter 2, a history of mobile security, as well as a discussion of prior
and current work done both in the academic and corporate realms will be presented.
Chapter 3 will present a detailed description ARM TrustZone technology and how
it can support the creation of an isolated software execution environment, known as
a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Chapter 4 will build upon this concept
of a TEE and detail proposed modifications to standard mobile cryptographic units
that will provide enhanced security features for mobile platforms. The results of
this merger will be presented in Chapter 5, and the subsequent conclusions will be
presented in Chapter 6.
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Background
The area of mobile security is vast and complex, consisting of a variety of standards,
protocols, and specifications. Further, this topic has been and continues to be addressed by academia, private industry, manufacturers, independent organizations,
and many other parties with a vested interest in mobile security. Unfortunately
there is currently no “one-size-fits-all” solution for addressing all mobile security issues, with the best software approaches being as mutable as the underlying hardware
architectures on which it runs.
In order to present information on the current secure platform ideologies in the
most concise and straightforward way, a history of mobile security will first be presented. This history provides insight on how mobile security has evolved over the
past twelve plus years and who the major players are that are impacting its direction. This also includes brief descriptions of many of the standards and specifications
that have been developed to address issues relating to mobile security. Research performed by academia is presented to show how these standards and specifications may
be used on various architectures, as well as modern uses of PUF technology in chip
security applications. This chapter concludes with a few examples of commercial
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applications and how they are attempting to utilize these tools to provide platforms
with secure execution environments.

2.1

A History of Mobile Security

As with most major technology families currently in use, the area of mobile security
has multiple functional specifications that describe the various levels of operation that
are necessary to support a so-called “secure” system. There are currently two primary
organizations that are providing and maintaining these specifications: GlobalPlatform (GP) and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). The Mobile Phone Working
Group (MPWG) is a part of the TCG and focuses specifically on the development
of specifications related to mobile security.
Before delving into the details of these specifications, it is important to understand the history of these two organizations and how they are being supported. In
this section, information on the most commonly used specifications in mobile security
will be presented. This is intended to be an informative overview of these documents,
rather than an in-depth analysis. Future sections of the paper will dig deeper into
the details of several of these documents, but at this point a general concept of each
will be presented instead.

2.1.1

GPD/STIP

GlobalPlatform was formed in 1999 and was the primary entity overseeing the Visa
Open Platform specification [16]. Visa Open Platform was originally created to
support the development of Java-based applets that could be run on Smart Card
devices. Since that time, GP has continued to focus on smart card development,
with additional work in the areas of device and system specifications. While their
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work in card and system specifications is significant, their development of devices
specifications is of the highest relevance to the research presented in subsequent
chapters. The most influential of these is the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE),
but everything started with their development of the GlobalPlatform Device/Small
Terminal Interoperable Platform (GPD/STIP) specification.
In the year 2000, the Small Terminal Interoperable Platform (STIP) e↵ort was
started with the incorporation of the STIP Consortium. Most initial work performed
by this group related to electronic-funds-transfer/point-of-sale (EFT-POS) terminals.
Despite this primary emphasis, work with mobile phones was also included. After
the release of the first comprehensive and flexible open specification for EFT-POS
in 2002 [17], several new member companies made the decision to join. The EFTPOS and a mobile profile were both proposed the following year based upon input
and support from these new members. The success of these proposals, as well as
the fact that many members already had strong relationships with GP, lead to the
transfer of this intellectual property from the STIP Consortium to GP. This was
done with the intention of providing a more stable and long-term environment for
supporting these standards, since the STIP Consortium was never intended to be
a large standardization body. The STIP specification then became known as the
GlobalPlatform Device / STIP, or GPD/STIP for short.
GlobalPlatform continued to develop and support various specifications over the
next few years. In 2007, GP published a white paper that became an announcement
of their intention to take on a much stronger role in the development of standards in
mobile security [18]. This paper, titled “Why The Mobile Industry is Evolving Towards Security”, advocated the need for an isolated execution environment, dubbed
the Secure Execution Environment (SEE), to provide proper security for mobile elements. At this time, GP pushed the use of their GPD/STIP technology to address
four focal areas:
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1. Interoperability

2. Security

3. Flexibility

4. Reactivity

To address these four paradoxes, the GPD/STIP card specifications were designed to utilize a portable base language, as well as a service control interface and
service control manager. A portable base language refers to the use of a language
that is agnostic to the underlying platform on which is it used. Supported languages
must also be object-oriented and strongly typed, such as Java. This provides developers with assurances that operations performed on one architecture will be handled
exactly the same on all other architectures. Additionally, data types and objects are
maintained and stored in an identical manner on all platforms. The theology behind
this approach was to allow developers to create single solutions that would work on
any platform. Members of GP knew that developers would be unwilling to create
unique implementations for every supporting device, nor did they wish to deal with
fragmentation issues that can result for some requirements.
Objects known as service control elements are meant to address the last two
requirements. Rather than requiring support for all possible resources that may
exist on any platform, each resource is instead treated as a service and is represented
by a software library. This library, and its associated functionality, is referred to as a
service control element. Using this methodology allows manufacturers to implement
a generic GPD/STIP compatible architecture, while including necessary libraries in
order to support devices with di↵erent resources and capabilities.
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2.1.2

Trusted Execution Environment

GlobalPlatform’s work in mobile security continued with the development of the
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Figure 2-2: Hardware Architectural View of REE and TEE
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The motivating factor behind the development of the TEE specifications is the
need to ensure isolated execution of critical code. The term “isolated” is meant to
imply that the code being executed cannot be a↵ected by the state or intent of any
other code running on the system. This philosophy is meant to address the possibility
of malicious code altering or intercepting information used to perform transactions
of a sensitive nature, such as banking transactions. If the code used to perform these
transactions can be “isolated” for this malicious code, a higher level of assurance can
be provided for the legitimacy of such transactions.
In order for a TEE to provides this level of isolation, hardware support is necessary. Hardware elements must provide a mechanism for switching between the
TEE and the standard execution environment, known as the Rich OS Execution
Environment (REE). It must also provides security for data and instructions store in
internal memory as well as external memory. Mechanisms must also exist for specifying which execution environments can access which peripherals. In essence, the
entire hardware architecture must support partitioning of access based upon these
two execution environments.
Further, in order for software developers to utilize these hardware features, a software Application Programmer Interface (API) is needed. Not every manufacturer
will want the exact same hardware partitioning setup. For instance, one manufacturer may want the cryptographic unit to be accessible by both the TEE and the
REE, while another may want it to only be accessible from the TEE. As a result,
programmers need an API that allows them to customize the access levels of the
hardware components. Further, the API must also provide methods for controlling the transition between the two execution environments, determining interrupt
destinations, message passing, and a variety of other functionality.
In order to create an isolated environment, the hardware is partitioned into two
execution levels: Trusted and Non-trusted. (These terms are used interchangeably
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There is no mandated implementation architecture for these components and they are only used here as
logical constructions within this document.

3.1

The TEE Software Architecture

The relationship between the major software systems components is outlined in the block architecture below
Chapter
2. Background
(Figure 3-1).
Figure 3-1: TEE System Architecture
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trustworthy capabilities for service providers, which can then be used through intermediary Client
Applications (CA).
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prohibited.

between these two modes of operation, or by multiple independent instances. For
instance, a TEE compliant System-on-Chip (SoC) may contain two separate ROMs,
one that is used by the TEE and a separate one that is used by the REE. In contrast
to this, there would likely be only one instance of a keyboard on the device. The
keyboard would therefore need to be able to function in a manner that allowed it
to be partitioned between the TEE and REE, thereby prohibiting access of TEE
memory locations from within the REE.
From a software point of view, the execution environment is also partitioned
between two states: a trusted and non-trusted, as depicted in Fig.2.2. In this figure,
there are references to two specific software APIs: the TEE Client API and TEE
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Internal API. The TEE Client API is used by Client Applications (CAs) to make
calls into Trusted Applications (TAs) in order to access trusted operations. The TEE
Internal API is provided to developers of Trusted Applications in order to access the
underlying hardware elements included on the platform. Further, a third mechanism
is also provided to facilitate efficient communication between the REE and TEE. This
mechanism is called the REE Communications Agent and manages shared memory
locations that are readable and writable by both worlds.
Inside of the TEE are two distinct classes of software: the Trusted OS Components and the Trust Applications. The purpose of the Trusted OS Components is
to provide OS style functionality to the entire TEE. This includes scheduling and
context switching, and should behave exactly like a standard kernel, only it exists
inside the TEE.
The Trusted Applications then run on top of this trusted kernel and provide the
actual functionality to be used by Client Applications. Each time a CA requests
access to a TA, a new instance of the TA is created and stored with its own state
and address space, thus isolating multiple instances of a TA from one another. These
TAs then interface with the Trusted OS Components via the TEE Internal API, as
defined in [21].
It is important to note that the TEE documentation does not define a specific architectural implementation, but rather dictates what an architecture must include in
order to be compliant. The implementation details are then left to the manufacturer
of the SoC. A more detailed analysis of TEEs will be provided in Section 3.

2.1.3

Open Mobile Terminal Platform

The concept of a Trusted Execution Environment was not introduced via the TEE
specification. In 2009, two years prior to the first TEE specification, the Open Mobile
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Terminal Platform (OMTP) released the latest versions of their Trusted Environment
and Advanced Trusted Environment specifications [22] [23]. These two specifications
helped to form the basis of many aspects of the TEE specifications.
The OMTP was originally founded in 2004. The purpose of the OMTP was
for discussion of standards with various parties in the mobile community and the
creation of standards that could be used across all areas and countries. While the
majority of their work did focus on mobile systems, they also produced standards
for a variety of wireless, embedded system type applications.
In 2010, the OMTP transitioned into a new entity called the Wholesale Applications Community [24]. At that time, the OMTP has nine full members and two
sponsors, including AT&T, Ericsson, and Nokia. Although the Wholesale Applications Community, or WAC, does still maintain the original specifications developed
by the OMTP, the primary focus has shifted to application development support
across various mobile platforms. Despite this fact, the original OMTP specifications
are still highly regarded and often sited in recently released specifications, such as
the TEE.

2.1.4

Trusted Environment: OMTP TR0

In 2009, the OMTP group released the latest version of their initial Trusted Environment document, known as OMTP TR0 [22]. This document was released prior
to GP’s release of their TEE specifications. The TEE specifications are said to be
in compliance with this document, not vice versa, though they can be considered
complimentary. The main purpose of this document was to identify the necessary
features and functions that must exist in various architectures that attempt to implement a Trusted Execution framework. This included the following applications:
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• Debug port protection
• Mobile device ID
• Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) lock
• Mobile Equipment (ME) personalization
• Digital Rights Management (DRM)
• Secure Boot (SB)
• Secure binding
• Secure flash update.
Although this document covers an array of mobile security areas, the primary
element of interest is the Secure Boot (SB) process. The SB process, as defined in
this document, stipulates the exact requirements of each stage of the boot process.
Since SB is a requirement of most other specifications, it is important to understand
how it works.
SB starts by executing code from a hardware controlled, integrity-protected memory location from within the System-on-a-Chip (SoC) device. Prior to executing any
additional code, such as multi-level bootloaders or the kernel, the integrity and authenticity of the code must be verified. Further, no commands received via external
interfaces are processed as validation of user input can lead to potential security
risks. This includes interfaces such as Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC),
and 802.11. And finally, in a multi-processor architecture, there are two options.
Either all processors can implement all of the secure boot requirements, which will
typically be wasteful and could lead to deadlock issues if not coded properly, or one
processor can perform all secure boot requirements while all other processors only
execute code that has already been properly authenticated.
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In addition to the SB process, the OMTP TR0 document also presents requirements for a Hardware Unique Key (HUK). The document requires that a HUK must
be generated using a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) either on or o↵
the device. Once loaded, this key can never be changed and must be stored in some
form of secure hardware or hardware-controlled secure memory. Further, access to
a HUK must be done only from secured/protected hardware or memory. External
reading of the HUK should never be possible and the HUK must be a minimum of
128 bits. The use of any non-established algorithms or techniques is also prohibited.
The full list of requirements is provided in HU 1 - HU 11 of Section 6.2 of [22].

2.1.5

Advanced Trusted Environment: OMTP TR1

After completing the TR0 document, the OMTP began working on TR1, known as
the Advanced Trusted Environment [23]. This document followed the same methodology used in the development of TR0, but attempted to provide a more “comprehensive security roadmap.” Topics covered in this document include:

• Trusted Execution Environment
• Secure Storage
• Flexible Secure Boot
• Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
• Run-Time Integrity Checking
• Secure Access to User Input/Output Facility
• Secure Interaction of UICC with Mobile Equipment
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The TR1 document, which also had its latest release in 2009, was the first to
formally specify requirements for a Trusted Execution Environment. The GP TEE
specifications discussed previously are based o↵ these requirements presented in TR1
for a Trusted Execution Environment, and any GP TEE compliant architecture
would also be fully compliant with the TR1 document. In the TEE environment
portion of the document, several specific requirements are listed that pertain to
items such as a HUK, provisioning and storage of private, secret, and/or root public
keys, application support requirements, and mechanisms for interactions between the
TEE and any other execution environment (EE) on the device.
Aside for the TEE requirements, the flexible secure boot (FSB) and run-time
integrity checking (RIC) sections are also of keen interest. The TR0 document first
presented the concept of SB, but focused mostly on the integrity and verification
metrics for the initial code. In TR1, the FSB is defined as a set of requirements
regarding the update, or modification, process for the initial code. Because it is never
expected that perfect code will (if ever) be developed the first time, a mechanism
must exist for updating code that is part of the SB process and which will not
adversely a↵ect the security integrity of the SB process.
The RIC section explicitly details the requirements for analyzing software currently running on a platform in order to assure that it has not been modified in any
way. This technique is meant to mitigate attack vectors that a hacker might use to
modify the expected behavior of a specific element of code.
For instance, consider an Apple iPhone. Due to the restrictions that Apple enforces on application purchasing through their App Store, hackers have developed a
method known as “jailbreaking” that provides the ability to run unsigned and unauthorized code on the device. This allows the device owner to install applications
from any application store he is willing to use. In order to do this, modifications
to the Kernel are required. This is typically done by exploiting some application on
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the device, gaining supervisor privileges, and then overwriting the kernel check in
memory. The actual steps required are significantly more involved and have been
published in detail [25].
The purpose of RIC is to specifically address issues that occur as a result of this
type of attack. If Apple used a RIC method, it would be possible to detect alterations
made to the Kernel after it had been loaded into memory. RIC is required to run
either in the OS, EE, or run-time modifiable software, or to run in collaboration
with software that as already been check for integrity. Ideal locations would then be
either a separate device, such as a SIM card, or inside of a TEE that is loaded as
part of the FSB process.

2.1.6

Mobile Trusted Platform Module

The Mobile Trusted Platform Module, or mTPM, is a standard developed by the
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) to bring Trusted Platform Module (TPM) functionality to mobile devices [2]. TPMs are frequently found on standard desktop
motherboards, as well as in laptop devices. Their primary function thus far has been
to provide a measurement/verification mechanism for implementing the SB process
on computers.
TPMs function by performing a hash of a given set of code. This value is then
hashed with an internal register to create a new value for that register. This is
called an “extend” operation. That value is then compared with a known, good
value. If they are the same, the boot continues; otherwise, the boot fails. This
continues throughout the boot process with each measurement being “extended”
onto an internal register, called a Platform Configuration Register (PCR). A prime
example of the use of TPMs is with Microsoft’s Bitlocker application [26]. Microsoft
has also mandated the use of TPMs starting with Windows 8 [27].
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Figure 2.3: Example of a Generalized Mobile Platform [2].
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Mobile Local-Owner Trusted Modules (MLTMs). The designation between Remote
and Local is based upon how execution is initiated on the ME. The User is considered the only Local agent as their execution is established locally through direct
interaction with the ME, such as through a provided graphical user interface (GUI).
The other three stakeholders must interact with the ME via an externally provided
TCG Mobilesuch
Trusted
interface,
asModule
cellular or Wi-Fi.

TCG Copyright
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Figure 2.4: Example execution flow of MRTM [2].

Start of informative comment:

Figure 2 shows a simple example of how a MRTM could be used. The MRTM would itself consist of a
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set bypurpose
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a Root-of-Trust-for-Verification
(RTV) and Root-of-Trust-forThe primary
of creating
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Measurement (RTM) module would be the first executable running in the runtime environment. The
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isolated EE that is capable of performing required operations outside of the influence of other stakeholders. In addition to executing in an isolated environment, the
mTPM also provides the ability to report the current state of each mTPM module.
Stakeholders are therefore able to determine the current state of their respective
modules on the ME and decide if their modules are in a state conducive to the
operations they need to perform. Such operations might include firmware/software
upgrades, network authentication, and e-Wallet transactions.
To better understand how an mTPM module would function, consider the example MRTM execution flow shown in Figure 2.4 [2]. The MRTM is based upon
a subset of the TPM v1.2 specification, which includes a Root-of-Trust-for-Storage
(RTS) and Root-of-Trust-for-Reporting (RTR) element. A Root-of-Trust (RT) basically consists of two things: a subset of trusted code along with an initialization
value for a corresponding PCR. Each RT may be established with the same code,
such as the code contained in the SecureROM, but each should have a unique initialization value for their respective PCR. Once the trusted code initializes the PCRs,
it should then verify the integrity of any subsequent code that will run as part of the
corresponding RT. Once this is done, the RT can validate its stated based upon the
current value of the PCR, and can also perform any supported operations.
Added to these two RTs are the Root-of-Trust-for-Verification (RTV) and Rootof-Trust-for-Measurement (RTM). The RTV and RTM are the first two elements to
execute on the system and represent the first stage trusted code described in the
SB protocol. One of the requirements of this code is to perform a measurement
of its execution code, which is then used to extend the PCRs into an initial state.
Once this is done, each subsequent EE is measured and verified by the RTV+RTM
and corresponding PCRs are extended with each operation. The last step of this
process is loading the full operating system (OS), which can then query the MRTM
to determine if it booted into a secure state. This is determined by examining the

30

Chapter 2. Background
values in one or more PCRs. Because the PCRs are contained within a secure element
and can only be indirectly modified via measured and verified code, the boot process
is declared secure if the resulting PCR values match previously defined good values.
Using this basic methodology for both MRTM and MLTM modules, a mTPM
compatible system would provide a means for multiple stakeholders to each have an
isolated measurement and reporting system for their respective collection of code
on the ME. To date, there have been no verified instantiations of a mTPM in a
consumer ME device. The TCG is currently working to produce the second version
of the mTPM specification and has already released a Use Cases document based
upon this latest version [29].

2.1.7

Other Organizations

As stated previously, this section was not intended to cover every organization currently engaged in various aspects of mobile security. However, it is also important to
mention two other organizations that are highly engaged in specification and requirements development of higher-level security functionality. These two organizations are
the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) [30] and the Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) [31].
The OMA is a group composed of various companies across the globe, typically
focused in one of four categories: wireless vendors, information technology companies, mobile operators, and application and content providers. When OMA was
originally form in June of 2002, there were nearly 200 companies associated with the
organization. The primary initiative of this group has been to bring together various
“mobile centered” organizations around the world to create unified specifications and
services that could be used globally. OMA also creates open standards related to
these four focal areas, such as the Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) and Instant
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Messaging (IM), both of which are heavily used on mobile devices today.
3GPP was created in December of 1998 and originally worked with specification
development for 3G mobile systems based on the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) standard. 3GPP has subsequently broadened its target technologies
to include Edge, W-CDMA, HSPA, LTE, and LTE-Advanced. Standards developed
by 3GPP typically focus around radio, core network, or service architecture. As such,
their results are focused more on the use of ME on provider networks, as opposed to
the development of the ME. Significant contributions of 3GPP include the Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and the Long Term Evolution (LTE)
protocols.

2.2

Hardware Support

Thus far, this paper has present information centered on formal specifications and
software support methods for mobile security. While these are certainly critical to
the goal of creating a secure mobile platform, the inclusion of hardware support is
equally critical. Further, some of the specifications developed, such as the TEE,
require hardware features in order to ensure specified capabilities. It is important
to note that all information presented on this topic was obtained through publicly
available documentation and not through non-disclosure agreements.
To better understand how these hardware features work to enable these capabilities, information will be presented on several of the major security suites provided
by chip manufacturers. This information is again provided as an overview; more
extensive details will be presented in Chapter 3. It is important to note that implementation details are often confidential and require a non-disclosure agreement
(NDA) with the corresponding company before any further information is released.
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2.2.1

TrustZone

TrustZone was first released by ARM, Limited, in 2003 and is currently on its 3rd
version [19]. TrustZone encompasses a collection of modifications and feature support
that provide hardware enforced, software execution isolation on ARM core processors.
In order to fully support an isolated EE, ARM updated its instruction set to include
methods of switching between environments, as well as made major modifications
to their hardware architecture in order to identify data and instructions as secure
versus non-secure.
The primary hardware change was the addition of a 33rd bit that was added to
the internal AXI bus, as well as all cache and internal memory elements. The value
of this bit is used to determine whether the transaction or memory is secure (0) or
non-secure (1). This bit is also present in a Current Status Register (CSR) and is
used to indicate the current operating state of the system. There are significantly
more details about how this functionality works, but this will be presented later in
Chapter 3.1.

2.2.2

M-Shield

Texas Instruments (TI) is one of the primary licensees of ARM technology, using
ARM based processors as the core of their OMAP processor line. M-Shield is the
name of the TI provided security suite that interfaces with ARM TrustZone technology to provide enhanced security functionality. As stated in the TI M-Shield
white paper, “...M-Shield mobile security technology is a system-level approach that
intimately interleaves optimized hardware and software..” [32]
M-Shield consists primarily of hardware components that are added to the main
SoC design, including SecureROM, SecureRAM, AES and public-key accelerators,
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SecureDMA, and a Secure State Machine. By utilizing TrustZone isolation mechanisms, M-Shield is able to provide these elements to users in both a secure and
non-secure manner.

2.2.3

SecureMSM

SecureMSM is a collection of security features o↵ered by Qualcomm that are very
similar to those provided by TI’s M-Shield technology. Unfortunately, little information is publicly available in with regards to implementation or functional details.
Most of the information obtained is high-level and provided through 3rd party developers.
SecureMSM is the name of Qualcomm’s security suite for their Snapdragon processors. This suite encompasses in-house hardware security elements, such as secure
boot, cryptographic accelerators, secure storage, etc., as well as a third-party TEE
kernel called MobiCore [33]. MobiCore was developed by Giesecke & Devrient and
was included to provided secure software functionality for financial transactions, like
mobile payment and secure PIN entry, as well as key management and user authentication [34] [35]. The MobiCore kernel serves as the TEE and TAs for the Snapdragon
platform (and possibly others).

2.3

Academic Research

Because the work being presented here focuses on secure execution on mobile devices
through the use of a PUF generated secret key, academic research will be divided
into two specific areas. First, research on the development of secure mobile devices
will be presented. Second, papers specifically addressing PUF implementations and
usage cases will be discussed. Finally, a few of the commercially developed security
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suites currently available will be discussed.

2.3.1

Mobile Security Research - IAIK

There are currently several groups around the world focused on the development
of trusted execution environments for mobile devices. One of the most prominent
groups is out of the Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) at the Graz University of Technology in Austria. The primary authors
in this group are Johannes Winter and Kurt Dietrich. Together, these two authors
have written several papers since 2007, each describing various aspects of a secure
mobile architecture for modern smartphone applications. The proposed architectural
elements are based on the incorporation of Mobile Trust Module (MTM) functionality.
As noted by the author, there were three primary implementation possibilities for
MTMs at that time. The first was completely in software, but was not feasible because no solid isolation mechanism existed at the time for code execution. (Although
TrustZone had been developed by this time, it was not widely used or adopted) The
second possibility was a separate IC on the device, which is a highly unlikely option
due to the real estate restrictions on modern devices. The final option was to embed
the functionality into an existing device or IC on the phone, such as the SIM card.
It was also noted by the author that such an implementation would need to be done
on an onboard card that is physically connected to the board, thereby reducing the
chance of an attacker or thief simply removing or replacing the SIM card.
Moving forward with the use of SIM cards with JavaCard runtime environment
support, the author presents a model architecture for a mobile device that could be
used to provide MTM functionality in support of Secure Boot (SB) and attestation
capabilities. While the idea is solid, the primary concern with this approach is
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the fact that trusted computing is being performed o↵ chip, thereby opening the
possibility of Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. The optimal architecture would
have this functionality on-chip, whether through dedicated silicon or a software-only
solution.
Johannes Winter presented a paper the following year that first introduced the
concept of using ARM TrustZone to create a trusted execution environment [36].
Winter proposed a secure mobile environment that utilizes TrustZone to support
MTM implementations in both a secure and non-secure environment. The architecture consisted of two separate operating systems, one executing inside the secure
world and one executing in the non-secure world.
The architecture further supported the use of virtual machines for each world,
allowing isolation between multiple processes and environments within each world.
Such isolation is required in order to comply with engine execution requirements, as
specified in the MTM reference architecture document [28]. The paper also addressed
issues concerning virtualization on ARM platforms, interrupt handling between multiple guest systems, and VM creation and deletion.
This paper presented a solid architecture for secure processing, but leaves serious questions about performance hits and/or processing requirements. While most
modern processors, including mobile processors, can support running two separate
kernels simultaneously, devices that require high performance or deterministic behavior would possibly fail under such an architecture. The author is unable to address
this concern due to lack of an actual hardware platform on which to test the proposed
architecture. This has become a recurring issue faced by many researchers over the
last few years, whether due to lack of “official” support for TrustZone, or inability
to modify boot code due to implementations of the secure boot protocol.
Building upon these two papers, Dietrich and Winter released another paper in
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2008 [37]. In their paper, the authors presented a software-only MTM architecture
enforced via ARM TrustZone technology. The methodology presented makes use
of SB to measure and verify the standard kernel image using MTM functionality.
Embedded in the kernel, as well as other applications, is a Reference Integrity Metric
(RIM) that can be used to validate the respective code. In order to provide this
functionality with as little alteration as possible, the authors proposed incorporating
RIM certificates inside the “notes” section of ELF binaries.
To prove that code has not been tampered with, the MTM performs a standard
set of measure->verify->extend operations on each code element in the SB process.
The result of each code segment measurement is compared with the value in the RIM
certificate. If that value matches, the associated Platform Configuration Register
(PCR) is extended and the boot sequence continues. Once the kernel is loaded and
begins execution, the final value in the PCR can be checked to determine if the
system booted into a trusted state, based on the final value of the PCRs.
The process described by the authors is e↵ective and is actually quite similar
to the process adopted by Apple for distribution of firmware files. Apple uses a
proprietary format known as Img3 that uses tags to identify di↵erent sections of a
firmware file. Each file contains at least these three sections: TYPE, DATA, and
CERT. The TYPE section provides information on the type of firmware for which
this file is used. The DATA section contains an encrypted copy of the compressed
firmware and is the actual code that is run on the device. The CERT section contains
an X.507 certificate that can be used to verify the firmware file and ensure it has
not been tampered with. If at any stage in the boot process a firmware file does
not pass the test, bootup is aborted and the system enters a recovery state where
it stays until a restore is performed and valid code is again loaded onto the system.
As noted previously, this is very similar to the approach presented by Dietrich and
Winter.
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These two authors continued their research in 2009 with another paper presenting
two design approaches for providing trusted computing building blocks [38]. The
first approach was based on a software emulated mobile TPM which used processor
extensions to achieve isolation, while the second makes use of onboard smart cards
as secure processing elements. These approaches were further discussed in a paper
presented the following year [39]. Such approaches were most likely pursued at this
point due to the lack of a customizable hardware platform that could be used to test
the previously discussed architectures. This difficulty was addressed by Winter and
presented in a paper in 2012 [40]. Having determined a hardware platform on which
to proceed, it is assumed that follow-on papers will provide implementation results
for each of these various architectures.

2.3.2

Mobile Security Research - Others

Dietrich and Winter were not the only two researchers to explore implementations
for supporting TEEs or MTM functionality. In a paper by Grossschadl et al. [41], the
authors discussed three concerns with the MTM specification that they felt needed
to be addressed.
The first concern dealt with the isolation requirements required for proper MTM
functionality. The authors made a valid point in stating that a separate chip with
dedicated MTM functionality is often not feasible due to cost and/or board space.
Their recommendation for attending to these concerns is the use of protected execution domains, such as the one provided via the use of ARM TrustZone. The second
and third concerns deal with the minimal cryptographic primitives required by the
MTM specification. The specification requires at least RSA with 2048-bit keys and
SHA-1 hashes, both of which are significantly outdated.
Further, as noted by the authors, there is no defined mechanism for updating
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exploited or outdated algorithms. However, MTM implementations typically make
use of the native functionality provided by the chip manufacturer in order to operate
properly, which is part of the reason the MTM specification does not provide a
specific design implementation. As such, it should be the responsibility of the chip
manufacturer, or the TEE developer, to provide a mechanism for adding or removing
cryptographic capabilities. Once that is done, the MTM specification does provide a
method for updating its own code, which could then make use of the newly provided
features.
Another group from Samsung also presented a collection of papers on the development of a new trusted mobile security architecture [42] [43]. This architecture
is also based around the implementation of the MTM specification and details the
use of Linux variants that support mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms,
such as Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux). The concept here is the exact same
as what was presented by Dietrich and Winter in that such security mechanisms
could be used to ensure isolation between multiple processes in the same operating
system, thereby ensuring each stakeholder’s MTMs are appropriately isolated from
one another.
Although the authors present a novel approach, which was likely used by Dietrich
and Winter in their work, it does not provide any information on how the “secure”
kernel is protected other than to state that it must be loaded as part of a secure
boot process. While the approach conceivably works for providing isolation between
MTM engines, it still resolves down to a software-protecting-software approach if it
is not accompanied by any hardware support mechanisms. If the “secure” kernel is
not isolated from all other applications on the devices, it is still subject to attack
by any installed application. However, considering the time at which the papers
were written (2007 and 2008), such mechanisms were not widely available or even
publicized. As such, the papers should be considered a novel and meaningful first
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step towards a secure mobile environment.
A paper presented by SuGil et al. also provides a MTM architecture for mobile
devices [44]. The approach taken by the authors was very similar to the approaches
already discussed. The primary features supported by this architecture were the
measure->verify->extend and remote attestation. The authors also propose the use
of RIM certificates for each application and element run on the device, allowing for
the analysis of each code element prior to execution.
However, as the authors noted, this does not prevent code injection methods once
the code has been stored in memory. Further, a white-list/black-list methodology
was used that lacks re-validation capabilities. Once an application is verified, it is
added to the white-list; any subsequent loads are not verified because the application
would have been added to the white-list. This implies that the application must only
pass verification once in order to be considered “good”. The application could be
modified in any number of ways after that point, but the architecture would continue
to load it based upon the whitepaper. Further, no information is provided on how
these lists are maintained or protected.
Researchers have also explored higher-level isolation techniques, such as those
presented by Muthukumaran et al. [45]. While their approach mentions dependence
upon MTM functionality to ensure secure boot, their primary focus is on the development of secure measurement capabilities inside the kernel. The group discusses
several integrity methodologies, such as Biba, LOMAC, Clark-Wilson, Clark-Wilson
Lite, Linux Integrity Architecture, and PRIMA. Their final architecture utilized
SELinux for MAC enforcement, together with PRIMA support, in order to protect
the software installation process. This process is considered to be the primary concern due to its need for interaction with untrusted programs.
Software MTM solutions are not the only implementation being considered. In
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2010, a paper by Kim et al. presented a complete MTM hardware design with
strong performance results [46]. The solution presented provided the first known
implementation of a dedicated chip that was compliant with the MTM specification.
Comparisons were made between this device and a USIM chip, largely based on the
functional similarities between the two elements.
However, as has been stated previously, performing such operations on a separate
chip always broadens the attack space of the overall device. If the interface bus, which
in this case is Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C), can be monitored, input and output
values are capable of being spoofed. Because the authors were primarily focused with
minimizing power consumption requirements, it is unlikely that communications into
and out of the chip are encrypted or otherwise obfuscated.
Despite addressing a serious security issue, the design does so by adding another
security concern. A complete security suite must perform all security related operations on-chip, rather than relying on o↵-chip to provide critical information and
results. Most modern SoC devices provide an internal cryptographic acceleration
unit, making it the ideal element for performing such operations.
As claimed previously in Section 1.3, the best method for maintaining critical data
elements, such as keys, known-good-results, and certificates, is through encryption
with a unique-per-device key that is not stored in any form of non-volatile storage. Further, the most secure method for implementing secure boot, secure storage,
MTMs, or any other secure service is via trusted software interfacing with internal
cryptographic units. The best-known method for accomplishing this is through the
use of a PUF generated secret key, as well as a Public/Private key pair. To better
understand how this can be accomplished, information of PUF research will now be
presented.
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2.3.3

Physically Unclonable Function Research

The concept of a Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) where originally proposed
in 1983 by D.W. Bauder at Sandia National Laboratory as a method for identifying
counterfeiting, or alteration, of a chip design [47]. PUFs continued to be explored
as a solution to such issues but soon found an additional use: random number
generation. PUFs provide a path through a collection of decision nodes that result
in a 0 or 1 value based upon the manufacturing characteristics of the device. A
PUF is provided with a challenge, which represents a collection of decision values for
each of the decision nodes, and produces a set of responses. Because of variations in
the manufacturing process, each device will produce di↵erent responses to the same
challenge.
As a result, many researchers have claimed that the “device unique” values generated by a PUF could be used as keys for cryptographic operations. This was first
proposed in 2004 by Lee et al. [14], and then in 2007 by Suh and Devadas [15]. Their
goal was to generate a key that could be used to provide device authentication. Their
research provided several methods for attempting to stabilize the results of a PUF in
order to provide consistent and repeatable results that could be used to generate a
cryptographic key. Once stabilized, the authors proposed the ability to use this key
in device authentication mechanism, such as IC identification. They also proposed
the use of the data as a seed for a random number generator, as well as using the
data as a key that could be tightly coupled with the processor in order to enable a
physically secure processor. The inherent weakness of this approach is that if the
key is successfully tied to the processor, an attacker may gain the ability to execute
on the processor and then read back the resulting key.
Further, the authors describe using a generated key in collaboration with a set
of challenges to provide an authentication mechanism. The process would require
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a trusted party to record responses produced by the IC to the provided challenges.
These responses would be maintained in a database, allowing the trusted party to
later send a challenge and compare the provided response with the one on record,
thereby proving the identify of the device. However, as stated by the author, challenges are never reused, an idea meant to alleviate concerns with MITM attacks. Such
a constraint though would either place an unnecessary constraint on the number of
authentications possible, require a significant amount of storage for challenge/response pair per device, or necessitate a update policy in which the device much be
taken back by the trusted party in order to create new sets of challenge/response
pairs. This also begs the question of what would prohibit an attacker from stealing
the device and running these tests on their own? While the attacker would not likely
be able to generate or store all possible challenge/response pairs, they could simply
re-invoke the authentication mechanism until they were provided with a challenge
that they had a valid response for, thereby allowing them to spoof the actual device.
Finally, the authors presented information on using PUFs to further generate runtime cryptographic keys that could be used for standard cryptographic operations.
The results produced by a PUF can at times change, based upon current physiological
conditions, such as voltage and temperature. This characteristic, as mentioned by the
authors, allows a PUF to be used as a random number generator (RNG) that could
produce unique keys for cryptographic operations at any time. Some cryptographic
operations might require a stable key, therefore obliging the developer to include
error correction code (ECC), while others may only be able to use keys with specific
characteristics, such as RSA. The authors do present satisfactory research into both
of these areas, but do not provide further information about how these keys are
accessed or used on the platform. This is a topic that will be addressed in the next
two chapters.
The concept of using PUFs to authenticate an entire system, rather than just a
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single device, was presented by Ibrahim and Nair [48]. The authors proposed the
use of a trusted party to maintain challenge/response pairs, similar to that of Suh
and Devadas. Various PUF capable elements on the device are provided with a challenge, and then provide their responses to a reader in the system. This reader then
aggregates all the responses received in order to generate a single system response.
This response can then be used to verify the entire system, as well as isolate which
element generated an invalid response if the overall system response was incorrect.
While this idea is certainly feasible and provides a strong status mechanism for
the system, it is still limited by the same problems mentioned previously for Suh
and Devadas. Further, the architecture presented by the authors lists wireless transmission mechanisms for transmission of PUF responses, and touts the fact that all
processing is performed o↵-chip. As a result, there is no mechanism for proving that
the IC inside the device actually generated the response. The original chip could be
removed, replaced by another, and then powered up at a nearby location. Because
all challenge/responses are conducted wirelessly, the chip can still provide the necessary responses without even being on the device, thereby presenting a false-positive
response for a valid operating state. Again, the concept of what was present is solid,
but the implementation mechanism is subject to a variety of attack methods.
Ibrahim and Nair also discussed the ability to generate a key and use it to aid in
the development of a Cyber Physical System, or CPS [48]. To this end, the authors
discussed the ability to incorporate multiple PUFs into a system in order to create
a paradigm called security fusion. Although details of how this new paradigm would
permeate into software were not included, the authors presented a system architecture wherein multiple elements, equipped with their own PUFs, would communicate
with a reader to provide results for generation of a system response. The collated
results from each of the elements would be compared with a known result to ensure
each element is functioning properly. A match would indicate that all systems are
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verified, while an incorrect value would cause the system to track down and identify
the malfunctioning element. This approach does seem feasible for helping to ensure
overall hardware security, but as it currently stands does nothing to ensure secure
execution of software.
The usage of PUF results in cryptographic applications has also been discussed.
To date, most of the applied uses involve using PUF generated results with RFID
elements [49] [50]. While this is a valid and useful application for PUFs, our primary
concern is the security of the TEE executing on the processor, an approach that to
date has not been formally defined by any research groups.
A critical aspect of using PUFs to provide cryptographic information of identification is dependent upon the ability to provide stable, repeatable results. As such,
a variety of groups began looking into methods of stabilizing the output generated
by a PUF. Such research included the ECC scheme presented previously by Suh and
Devadas [15], as well as the use of a SRAM-PUF by Bohm et al. [51], 2D Hamming
codes [52], XOR masking [53], longest increasing subsequence algorithm (LISA) [54],
majority voting [55], and soft decision decoders [56].
The primary security concern generated by these proposed solutions is the requirement to store the syndrome, or helper data, about the PUF publicly. This
allows an attacker to ascertain a certain amount of information about the PUF simply by observing these data. This problem was specifically addressed by [57]. A
second method was also proposed by Paral and Davadas that use pattern matching
to regenerate keys, but uses indices into sets of PUF challenges as secret key bits,
rather than the typical approach which simply uses the PUF response bits as the
actual secret key [58].
Other security concerns also cropped up in some of these approaches. The SRAM
PUF [51] is a prime example. As the authors noted, the ability of a software appli-
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cation to read the contents of the SRAM would prove critical to the security of the
generated key. While the ability to use the SRAM to create a stabilized key may be
a viable method, from a security standpoint it would be difficult to ensure that no
attacker was ever able to gain execution privileges or code access to the SecureROM.
A prominent example of such an attack is the A4 bootROM exploit developed by
GeoHot [59].

2.4

Commercial Implementations

Now beginning to realize the vast market currently available in the mobile world,
companies have also begun creating “secure” execution environments for consumer
devices. These companies, like the academic researchers, are attempting to address
the need for security during critical mobile transactions, such as banking and NFC.
Although most major banking companies will likely wait for a definitive standard
before committing to full entry into the mobile world, that is not stopping security
companies from touting the high security services provided by their solutions. Further, if their solutions can align themselves with the current trajectory of many of
the specifications presented previously, adaptation once the specification is approved
should be achieved relatively quickly.
OKLabs out of Australia was one of the first mobile security companies to present
a security solution. Their approach involves the use of virtualization to provide
isolation between various processes running on the system [60] [61] [62]. OKLabs
also heavily advertises the use of a microkernel in conjunction with virtualization
as a method for minimizing the overhead of multiple simultaneous OS instances
[63] [64] [65]. To prove the feasibility of their approach, OK Labs presented a case
study of their technology on the Motorola Evoke QA4 device [66]. While their
work is impressive, it is yet again another example of software protecting software.
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Further, the attack space on a software application that attempts to virtualize all
the underlying hardware is enormous in comparison to two execution environments
with hardware-enforced control of access privileges.
Another company that has been diligently working in the mobile security area
is Trusted Logic in France. Trusted Logic boasts a security suite called Trusted
Foundations [67] that provides a software API that interfaces with on-chip security
peripherals, such as cryptographic engines. This software suite has been incorporated
into variants of the TI OMAP 4 processor family [68]. Further, the financial firm
Gemalto has even worked with TI to create a secure banking product that can be run
on OMAP processors equipped with the Trusted Foundations software [69]. The fact
that Trusted Logic has been able to garner such support for its product just further
illustrates that companies are very interested in utilizing this type of technology.
The last company that will be discussed is Giesecke & Devrient out of Germany.
This company developed the MobiCore security suite that was mentioned as part of
the Qualcomm SecureMSM solution in Section 2.2.3. MobiCore is a secure OS that
makes use of ARM TrustZone technology to create a TEE [34]. G&D have lauded
this new technology for providing DRM protection [70] [71], DRM for mobile [72],
virtual private networking (VPN) [73], and even secure smartphone applications [35].
MobiCore got a big lift when it was announced that it would be incorporated in the
eagerly anticipated Samsung Galaxy S III devices [74]. The incorporation of this
technology allowed Samsung to begin using the NFC communications provided with
the Google Android OS.
As can be seen from the vast amount of research and development that is currently
being conducted, mobile security is an extremely popular and prized area of interest.
While all of these solutions are cropping up for securing execution on mobile devices,
the primary question of interest should be, to paraphrase Lois Lane, “who’s got
you?” It can be seen how all of these standards and technologies provide protection
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for applications and providing secure execution, but how are they being protected
when they are not running? Is the secure boot process sufficient to protect these
executing environments and prove that everything is running properly? In order to
address these questions, it is necessary to better understand what ARM TrustZone is
and exactly how it provides the means for creating a trusted execution environment.
Further, how can ARM TrustZone work with a TEE to control access to critical data
and properly authenticate a device?
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In 2003, ARM released the first version of a new technology suite called TrustZone [3].
In addition to the hardware features provided, ARM developed a TZ Application
Programmer Interface (API) that could be used by software developers to interact
with the underlying hardware features. This API, currently at version 3.0, became
the basis for the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) specifications [19]. It is
important to note that TZ is not a software security implementation; it is a collection
of hardware extensions to the ARM core architecture that support software isolation.
The provided API is a suggested framework and can be altered or replaced by any
software developer.
Using TZ to provide software isolation has allowed for the creation of a variety
of mobile security solutions and specifications, such as TEEs. The question becomes whether or not this functionality is capable of addressing the issues of security
for system critical resources and authentication. This question is addressed in this
chapter, as greater details about TrustZone and Trusted Execution Environments

49

registers befor e switching between secure and non-secure states.
The S-bit is used throughout the system to keep the secure and non-secure domains
completely distinct. TrustZone technology includes a modified memory system – the
cache and MMU incorporate the S-bit and so become security-aware. The S-bit can
only be accessed by the Monitor, which itself can only be entered through a limited
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are presented.

3.1

Page 5 of 8
TrustZone Architecture

When ARM initially presented TrustZone to the electronics community at large [3]
[75], the primary new architectural feature they touted was the inclusion of a 33rd
address/data bit known as the “security” or “S-bit”. This bit serves a single purpose:
identify the address, data value, or system state as either secure or non-secure.
The value of this bit is controlled via a special software element known as the
“Monitor”. The monitor runs in a special operation mode (Monitor mode) and is in
charge of handling the transition between the secure and non-secure worlds, as well
as intercepting interrupts and forwarding them to their corresponding world. The
Monitor can only be entered by way of a fixed set of entry points, thereby reducing
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the attack surface through which attackers can inject data. This approach allows
testing of the interface to become a somewhat practical idea, which in turn allows
the idea of a secure system to reemerge. The layout of this design is shown in Fig.
3.1.
In addition to being used within the ARM core itself, the S-bit has also been
incorporated into the Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture (AMBA) bus. This
bus served as the primary bus at the time TZ was originally developed and was
used to connect peripherals to the microprocessor. The inclusion of the S-bit allows
designers to establish peripheral devices and their coinciding transactions as secure
or non-secure. Developers of external peripherals only need to add a small wrapper
to their design that is capable of reading this bit and handling it accordingly. In
most cases this allows the majority of hardware designs to remain unaltered.
The S-bit has also been merged into the cache and Memory Management Unit
(MMU). Doing so allows data and instructions fetched from memory to remain in the
cache regardless of the current state of the system. One of the biggest performance
hits of this style of segregation is the flushing of memory locations when the processor moves between states. Ordinarily failure to perform such a flush would pose a
potential security risk as the normal world might be able to analyze what the secure
world was doing and possibly even retrieve secure data still located in the cache. By
identifying each memory address as containing a secure or non-secure value, flushes
are no longer needed because the processor can enforce access controls on the data
based upon the current state.
Since TZ was initially created in 2003, the S-bit has continued to be a critical
element of the overall design. It is difficult to determine exactly what changes have
occurred since the original TZ architecture was released, as documentation of earlier
versions is no longer available. However, recent documentation emphasizes several
features not discussed in the original white paper provided by ARM.
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As depicted in a paper in 2009 [4], such features include:

1. AMBA3 Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) bus support
2. The Secure Configuration Register (SCR) in the system control CoProcessor
15 (CP15)
3. The Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction

While there are also other important and noteworthy components of TZ, such as
secure debugging capabilities, only the portions that relate directly to the research
being presented will be covered. The next three sections will discuss each of these in
greater detail.

3.1.1

TrustZone AXI Support

In order to best understand the changes made to the TZ-compatible devices, consider
the generic mobile architecture presented in Fig. 3.2. The ARM processor core is
only a small piece of the overall device architecture, and as such must maintain a
mechanism for identifying peripherals and transactions as secure or non-secure. By
incorporating support for TZ into the AXI bus via the inclusion of the S-bit, TZ
aware peripherals can be properly configured and act accordingly based upon the
state of each transaction.
It is important to note that not every element in this architecture must be TZaware. For instance, by making only the MMU TZ aware, other memory peripherals,
such as the Boot ROM, SRAM, DRAM, and Flash, can be automatically protected by
requiring all memory accesses to be controlled by the MMU. Further, some elements
may not even need to be included. Which elements are and are not included is
dictated by the system designer and is often based upon what is needed by the
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way that it works with the security solution, rather than developing each sub-system
independently of the security requirements. If the threat model for a device indicates
that it needs to protect against shack attacks, there is no point securing only the
functional part of the system. An attacker with unrestricted access to a debug port can
bypass many of the functional protections that may exist.
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This is illustrated in Fig 3.3, an example architecture showing how TZ support may
be partitioned throughout a mobile architecture design.

3.1.2

TrustZone Secure Configuration Register

The Secure Configuration Register, or SCR, is used to maintain information about
the TrustZone security settings currently being used. While the specific bits and their
associated purposes may vary from one architecture to another, the least significant

53

Chapter 3. TrustZone and Trusted Execution Environments TrustZone System Design

Modem

Main Processor
SRAM

Cortex-R4
Secure
Boot
ROM

DMA
(PL330)

TZMA
(BP141)

DRAM

Legend:
Non-secure

NFC
Module

L2 Cache
(PL310)

AXI Bus
Debug Bus

TZASC
(PL380)
DMC
(PL340)

Cortex-A9
Generic
Interrupt
Controller
(PL390)

SMC
(PL350)

Flash

Trace
Port

Debug
Access Port

JTAG +
Boundary
Scan

Trace

Display
Controller

Display

S
S
S

TZPC

RTC

NV Counter

Timer

OTP Fuse

NS Timer

KMI

DAC

Keyboard

Mobile
Aerial

SoC Perimeter
Secure

Configurable or Security Aware

S
S
NS
NS

AXI to APB
Bridge

Figure
6-1 : TheARM
Gadget2008
SoC[4].
design
Figure 3.3: Example mobile architecture
supporting
TrustZone

Note
Note that this design only shows the aspects that are relevant to, or overlap with, the
bit
is always
used
to identify
the current
state of the
system
withperipherals,
“0” representing
security
of the
system.
Most Normal
worldTZ
peripherals,
and
all system
such
as power
are not shown.
secure
andcontrollers,
“1” representing
non-secure. Although the SCR is a 32-bit register, only
8-10 bits are typically ever used. These bits are usually used to dictate how the
system
to specific
actions, such as an IRQ or FIQ interrupt, and what
Puttingresponds
the software
together
functionality is present while in the secure and non-secure worlds.
The software architecture can similarly be outlined, as shown in Figure 6-2 on
page 6-16. In this design the Secure world is implemented around microkernel
For example, the ARMv7 architecture uses 10 bits of the SCR [76]. One of
principles and pushes critical system components, such as device drivers, into unique
these
bits, called
user-space
tasks. the F-bit Writable (FW) bit, is used to control access to the F-bit
ofThree
the Current
Status are
Register
(CPSR).
F-bit
of the
CPSR
is used
separate Program
security services
installed
into theThe
Secure
world,
one
for each
of theto
DRM, masking
GadgetStore
and
mobile
payment
use By
cases.
These services
areofresponsible
for
enable
of the
Fast
Interrupt
(FIQ).
disabling
the ability
the non-secure
managing all of the sensitive assets associated with each use case and making use of
world to mask this interrupt, the secure world can establish a timer that triggers on
hardware, via the secure device drivers, to adequately protect them.
54

Chapter 3. TrustZone and Trusted Execution Environments
a regular interval and generates an FIQ exception, thereby assuring that the secure
world executes on a deterministic period. This is the most common approach used
and is recommend by ARM as the defacto method for preemptive execution of the
TEE.
Access to this register is also restricted to software running in the “supervisor”
mode within the secure world. For systems that implement a full-fledged kernel
within the secure world, this provides access restrictions that the kernel can utilize
to ensure individual applications running within the TEE cannot change these values.
While it would be assumed that any application executing inside the secure world
has been proven “trusted”, placing all control into the hands of the trusted kernel
provides a small amount of added security.

3.1.3

TrustZone Secure Monitor Call

The Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction, formerly known as the Secure Monitor
Interrupt (SMI), is a part of the security extensions added to the ARM core. The
intended use of this function it to provide a mechanism through which the non-secure
world can call into the Monitor, thereby invoking a switch to the secure world. This
capability is controlled through the SCR discussed previously. The execution of
the SMC instruction will either result in the normal execution of the SMC or will be
treated as an “UNDEFINED” instruction and generate the corresponding exception,
depending upon how its functionality is defined in the by the secure world.
This instruction is the primary mechanism used by drivers developed within the
REE, or more specifically the REE communications agent. Rather than forcing the
system to wait until the TEE next executes, the SMC provides a mechanism by which
the REE can call into the TEE for access to trusted peripherals or for execution of
trusted applications. Once the secure world completes the requested operation, the
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Monitor will restore execution to the REE, one instruction after the SMC instruction.

3.1.4

TrustZone Memory Support

Memory support in a TZ architecture is significantly di↵erent than what is found in
most modern CPU architectures. This is primarily due to the support requirements
inherent to implementing two isolated execution environments. As discussed previously, flushing of the internal cache, instruction pipelines, and Translation Lookaside
Bu↵ers (TLBs) can result in significant performance hits. To address these concerns,
ARM decided to integrate the S-bit directly into the internal level one cache of its
processor cores.
The internal memory structure in an ARM core consists of two primary elements,
a TLB for maintaining virtual-to-physical mappings, and the level one (L1) cache
area. Using the standard cache methodology, instructions and data are prefetched
into the L1 for access by the processor. When the processor requests this information,
it includes a marker called the Non-Secure (NS) bit. The NS-bit is another name
for the S-bit and represents the value of the NS-bit in the CPSR at the time of the
access. Each instruction and data value fetched is correspondingly labeled when it
arrives in the cache.
The virtual address that is used by the processor to request a specific piece of
data also includes an additional bit, called the Non-Secure Table Identifier (NSTID).
This bit does not indicate the state of the system when the request is made, but
rather identifies the state to which the memory belongs. It is important to note that
in TZ architectures, it is possible for the secure world and the non-secure world to
share memory, as well as for the secure world to provide introspection of non-secure
memory. Therefore, even if the processor is currently executing in the secure world,
it may wish to retrieve data values from the non-secure world memory. In this case,
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An example of this was shown in Fig. 3.3. This figure contains a module called the
TrustZone Address Space Controller, or TZASC. Such a module can be placed inbetween the main processor and the memory element, thereby allowing the memory
element to remain unchanged. The purpose of the TZASC is to monitor transactions
to the memory and determine access permissions based upon the value of the NS
bit. The TZASC must maintain partition information in the event physical memory
is partitioned between secure and non-secure memory, again allowing for the coexistence of mixed memory elements. To reduce storage requirements for security
settings, memory is usually identified as secure or non-secure in variably sized pages,
rather than individual byte addresses.

3.1.5

TrustZone Interrupt Handling

Interrupt handling is the last major change required by the TZ architecture. Interrupts are used to indicate to the processor that some external peripheral needs to
communicate with the processor. Based upon how this peripheral has been set up,
such a request could indicate the need to transfer non-secure or secure information.
It is therefore necessary for the processor to determine which type of interrupt has
been generated and whether a change in the execution state is necessary in order to
service the interrupt.
To handle this type of situation, ARM has advocated the use of multiple Exception Vector Tables (EVTs), used to maintain the address of interrupt service routines.
Such an implementation is shown in Fig. 3.5. As illustrated, the ARM architecture
supports seven possible interrupts. In order to firewall the transfer of information
between the non-secure and secure world, it is necessary to keep separate EVTs for
each world, plus one additional EVT for the Monitor. Once an interrupt occurs, the
current state of the processor is compared with the state of the interrupt. If they are
the same, the interrupt is simply forwarded on to the appropriate execution environ-

58

ustZone Hardware Architecture
Chapter

3. TrustZone and Trusted Execution Environments

Normal world

IRQ

Secure world

User

User

Supervisor

Supervisor

FIQ

FIQ

IRQ

IRQ

IRQ

Undef

Undef

Abort

Abort

System

System

Monitor

IRQ

Figure 3.5:
interrupt
for TrustZone
architectures
[4].
Figure 3-3 : One possible
IRQExample
routing in
a designtable
withstructure
IRQ configured
as a non-secure
interrupt

To prevent malicious Normal world software masking sensitive Secure world interrupts
the processor hardware includes a configuration register in CP15 which can be used to
prevent any Normal world software modifying the F (FIQ mask) and A (external abort
mask) bits in the CPSR. This control register can only be accessed by Secure world
software. Note that there is no option to prevent the Normal world masking IRQ
ment. If not, execution is transferred to the Monitor, which determines the correct
interrupts.
state and performs the required transition. Isolation of the EVTs can be done in
Processor exception vector tables
two ways: separate interrupt controllers, or the use of a single TZ-aware interrupt
To
provide the
behavior
described
controller,
suchexception
as the PL390
shown
in Fig.above,
3.3. a TrustZone-enabled processor
implements three sets of exception vector tables. One of these tables is for the Normal
world,
one is for
the Secure
world,
and the
other
is for Monitor
mode. Such trapping
Trapping
interrupts
in the
Monitor
is not
possible
for all interrupts.

The
basesupported
address of for
the IRQ
Secure
world
at reset isconfigurable
in accordance
the setting
of
is only
and
FIQtable
interrupts,
in with
the SCR.
Because
the VINITHI processor input signal; 0x00000000 if it is not asserted, 0xFFFF0000 if it is.
IRQs are the most common interrupt, it is suggested that this interrupt maintain
The base address of the other tables is undefined, and should be set by software before
its normal functionality whenever possible. As mentioned in Sec. 3.1.2, the secure
use.
world can
setupgenerations
the FIQ tooftrap
into
the Monitor
and thenofdisable
this
Unlike
previous
ARM
processors,
the location
each ofmasking
the tablesofcan
be
moved at
This is achieved
by programming
appropriate
Vectorworld
Base to
interrupt
byrun-time.
the non-secure
world. This
ensures the the
ability
of the secure
Address Register (VBAR) in CP15.
run and prohibits malicious code running in the non-secure world from preventing
execution of the TEE.

59

Chapter 3. TrustZone and Trusted Execution Environments

3.2

Trusted Execution Environments

The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) specification was originally started in
2009 after the TZ API was donated to the GlobalPlatform group. The TEE is based
on security requirements outlines in the OMTP TR1 document [1] [23], but resembles
the TZ examples from an architectural standpoint. The collection of TEE documents
released thus far are explicit in affirming that the specifications do not advocate or
require any specific hardware implementation, but rather state what functionality is
necessary in a supporting architecture.
An initial overview of the TEE specification was presented previously in Sec.
2.1.2. Because the TEE specification is mostly focused on the software implementation, this section will focus predominately on software only. It will be assumed that
whatever architecture is used to execute the TEE is fully compatible with hardware
requirements, or has full ARM TZ support, which is TEE compliant.

3.2.1

TEE Software Architecture

As stated by the TEE documentation, “the goal of the TEE Software Architecture
is to enable Trusted Applications to provide isolated and trustworthy capabilities
for service providers, which can then be used through intermediary Client Applications” [1]. This is illustrated in the previously presented TEE reference software
architecture, shown again Fig. 3.6.
Based upon this design concept, the entire execution environment and device peripherals can be divided into two groups: public (non-secure) and trusted (secure).
The Rich-OS Execution Environment (REE) consists of the Rich-OS, as well as all
untrusted applications and public peripherals. The Trusted Execution Environment
consists of some primary program, perhaps a full-fledged kernel, with trusted appli-
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There is no mandated implementation architecture for these components and they are only used here as
logical constructions within this document.

3.1

The TEE Software Architecture

The relationship between the major software systems components is outlined in the block architecture below
Chapter
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(Figure 3-1).
Figure 3-1: TEE System Architecture
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trustworthy capabilities for service providers, which can then be used through intermediary Client
Applications (CA).

cations and trusted peripherals. Any peripheral available to both environments is
Copyright 2011
GlobalPlatform
Inc. All Rights in
Reserved.
considered
public.
Additionally,
order to help facilitate communications between
The technology provided or described herein is subject to updates, revisions, and extensions by GlobalPlatform. Use of this
information is governed by the GlobalPlatform license agreement and any use inconsistent with that agreement is strictly
prohibited.

the two worlds, shared memory locations can be established for the transfer of data.
The REE consists of three primary elements: TEE Functional Application Programming Interface (API), TEE Client API, and the REE Communications Agent.
In most cases the communications agent will consist of any required kernel drivers
that will populate communication structures for message and data passing between
the REE and TEE, as well as the invocation of SMC instructions where possible. The
TEE Client API is used to facilitate communications between the REE and the TEE
by making appropriate calls to the communications agent. The TEE Functional API
sits at the highest level and is meant to provide a set of Rich-OS friendly APIs that
can utilize the Client API and communications agent to access TEE applications.
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A communications agent also exists on the TEE side. The communications agent
is responsible for interpreting requests from the REE and forwarding the request to
the corresponding Trusted Application (TA) or Trusted Kernel. The TEE Internal
API “defines a set of C APIs for the development of Trusted Applications running
inside a Trusted Execution Environment.” [21]. In addition, the API provides access
to the trusted peripherals via interactions with the Trusted OS Components, also
knows as the “hosting code”.
When a Client Application (CA) needs to communicate with a TA, a session is
opened. The session begins by first invoking an instance of the TA. Each session involves a unique instance of the TA, each with its own independent physical memory
space. Once the instance is created, commands and data can be exchanged between
the CA and TA, either through the communications agents, or via a shared memory location. Once the transaction completes, the TA instance is terminated and
execution resumes.

3.3

Security and Customization of Trusted Execution Environments

At the time this paper was written, GP was still working on the development of
additional TEE documents, including information on the lifecycle of TAs. Some of
the primary issues in this regard are: “What services are available within the TEE?”,
“How long do TAs stay on the device?”, and “How are new services uploaded to the
device?” Additionally, “How are updates of the TEE handled?”
TrustZone provides a mechanism for implementing and support TEEs, but it provides no inherent mechanism for upgrading or customizing such an implementation.
The Secure Boot (SB) specification discussed previously requires measurement and
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verification of every software element used in the boot process prior to its execution.
Storage of “known-good” values used for comparison is often located on the device,
and a TZ-TEE combination could be used to protect these values.
But what happens if a device is compromised? Firmware files are almost always
unique per platform, not per device. Leakage of a key, certificate, hash, or other
value, may result in the compromise of a single system initially, but because such
information is not unique, a leakage on one device results in a leakage to all such
devices. Firmware files could be decrypted, modified, encrypted, and then written
to any other device with no way of knowing that such files are not legitimate.
Addressing such concerns requires the ability to secure this type of information
in a unique manner on each device, yet still provide a mechanism for SB. Not many
companies are going to want to independently encrypt the firmware for each device.
Such an approach would not only be time consuming, but would also require the
company to know the secure key for each device in order to encrypt it prior to
uploading or burning the information into the device. This would necessitate storage
and resource consumption that not only cost time, but also would require a significant
financial investment. The maintenance of this information would also provide a huge
financial liability because loss of this information would prohibit a user from updating
his or her device, thereby exposing the company to potential lawsuits. Further, this
method would still require a key to be burned into the device, or stored in some form
of non-volatile, secure memory. Thus, there is still no mechanism for updating the
key in the case of compromise.
In order to develop a mobile security solution that is capable of addressing all
of the issues presented thus far, research needed to be conducted into each of the
following areas:

1. Generation of unique-per-device secret key
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2. Storage of unique-per-device secret key
3. Protection of TEE in storage
4. Protection of TEE measurement/verification values
5. Update/modification mechanism for TEE

In Sec. 1.1, a collection of concerns were presented that are all a direct result of
these types of security holes. Properly merging and applying a set of solutions from
various mobile platform can generate a new solution that is capable of alleviating
such concerns by providing a mechanism to handle each of these areas. Additionally,
this solution is also capable of addressing the need for a device-unique authentication
method, as discussed in Sec. 1.3.
The solution presented in this research is based upon the use of a Physically
Unclonable Function (PUF) to generate a “unique-per-device” secret key, as well as
a random number to be used as a seed for generation of a RSA public/private key
pair. These three keys can be reproduced at boot time, thereby eliminating the need
to store them in any form of nonvolatile storage. Once generated, they can also
be used to protect system critical information in a unique manner without altering
or diminishing any of the original protection mechanisms. A detailed explanation
of this approach, as well as a comprehensive view of its internal structure, will be
presented in Chapter 4.
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As stated previously, the purpose of this research is an analysis of current mobile
security mechanisms and a determination of how PUF technology can be leveraged
to provide enhanced data security and device authentication on mobile platforms.
A variety of implementations and methodologies have been presented that have attempted to address many of the security issues that the mobile world faces today.
But in order for those mechanisms to keep a system safe, they must themselves be
kept safe from attacks that would seek to bypass or disable their functionality.
Currently, most systems rely upon cryptography to protect sensitive information stored on a device, such as trusted code used during the secure boot process.
Symmetric encryption is typically used for protecting data, and SoC manufacturers
have even begun providing locations for “secure” storage of cryptographic keys with
the device [32] [33]. Such locations include secure ROMs and electronically programmable eFuse arrays, as well as o↵ chip devices, like smart cards and SIM cards.
Based upon the increased use of these elements in a growing number of applications,
it would be difficult to make a claim that mobile security has not been enhanced by
their incorporation into designs. However, that does not imply that the security of
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these architectures cannot be improved upon, or that their security is infallible.
The primary security risk inherent to storing cryptographic information on these
devices is the potential for such value to be leaked or otherwise exposed. Since these
keys are often used to protect security critical elements, access to the key or its
value would allow for the unauthorized modification of such elements on any a↵ected
device. The risk to devices is further compounded by the potential for key values to
be shared across multiple devices.
Manufacturers occasionally send firmware updates to devices in order address
software bugs and security issues. These files are usually encrypted and/or digitally
signed. Rather than creating a unique version of the firmware file for every device
manufactured, it is more logical that a manufacturer would use a single secret key
or public/private key pair to perform cryptographic operations on these files. In
order for each device to able to verify the authenticity of the firmware files, the
corresponding key(s) must be stored in some form of non-volatile storage on the
device. Additionally, this key would be the same on all supporting devices.
In cases such as this, leakage of the key or information about the key can have
a much broader impact. Once an attacker has been able to obtain the necessary
information from one device, that information can be used in attacks against all
other devices that utilize the same key(s). Because there have been no recorded
incidents of leakage of such keys, it is logical to assume that the odds of such a leak
or exposure are small. It is, nonetheless, an unnecessary risk.
In addition to concerns about the security of the system if the key is every exposed, theft of mobile devices is also a concern that needs to be addressed. To
protect against theft, there must exist a mechanism for accurately identifying mobile
equipment and associating this equipment with a mobile user. The reason for this
is that it is often possible for a thief to steal a device and then active it for use on
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another cellular account. The International Mobile Equipment Identifier, or IMEI,
was developed specifically for the purposes of uniquely identifying mobile devices.
Because IMEI numbers are supposed to be unique per device, most manufacturers
store the IMEI in a one-time programmable, non-volatile memory location, such as
an eFuse array. The use of an eFuse array provides manufacturers with an easy
method for setting this information on a per device basis without having to modify
the design of every device produced. What this means though is that the value
can be changed by anyone with the necessary equipment to blow the fuses, though
changes can only be made to previously un-blown fuses. Since the eFuse array value
is frequently read and returned via software, an exploited device can be programmed
to return any arbitrary value, rather than the valid IMEI number programmed by
the manufacturer.
Considering the security issues presented thus far, it is easy to see that a better
system is needed if any progress is to be made in the field of mobile security. In this
chapter, an architecture for mobile devices is presented that addresses many of the
security issues discussed here and in previous chapters. Specifically, this architecture
utilizes a PUF to generate unique, per device values that may be used for cryptographic operations and device identification. It is proposed that by integrating PUF
technology into a cryptographic processor in an isolated environment within the SoC,
secure cryptographic key generation is possible and that the results will be unique
for every supporting device. Further, it is proposed that a software Application Programming Interface (API) operating inside of a Trusted Execution Environment can
be used to provide the required functionality in the most secure manner possible.
By combining these two architectural features, a new mobile security framework can
be developed that will greatly increase the overall security of the device, as well as
providing stronger mechanisms for device authentication and protection of security
critical code and data.
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4.1

PUF Enhanced Cryptographic Engine

Of all the issues that have been discussed thus far, some of the primary questions
that could be asked are:
• “Why is so much of the security analysis done on the CPU, where every attacker
yearns to live?”,
• “Why are these security critical elements accessible by the processor, and thus
by the associated OS?”,
• “How can the processor be trusted to accurately identify itself if unaltered
execution of the corresponding code cannot be guaranteed?”,
• “Would moving this functionality to a more secure location to which attackers
don’t have access fix the problem?”, and
• “If so, is creation of such an environment possible?”
Section 2.3.3 discussed the capability of generating secret keys, as well as public/private key pairs, through the use of PUFs. Because most modern SoC designers
have begun adding cryptographic accelerators to their chips [32] [33], it would be
fairly straightforward to simply tie in the response of a PUF challenge directly to
the cryptographic unit. Since cryptographic accelerators are considered separate elements in a SoC and are not a part of the processor, access to the results of the PUF
challenge can be isolated from the main processor. This method would restrict access
to the PUF results to within the cryptographic engine, while still providing the process with the capability to interface with the crypto engine and perform operations
that utilize the provided results.
To better illustrate the proposed architecture, consider the generic SoC design
depicted in Figure 4.1. This figure shows a very simple SoC architecture consisting
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CPU

SRAM

e-Fuse

DRAM

Crypto Engine

Figure 4.1: Simplified, generic SoC architecture

of a CPU with connections to DRAM, SRAM, eFuse array, and the crypto engine.
Figure 4.2 shows what might be contained with the crypto engine. The engine
will typically have some form of FIFO/DMA input/output features for moving data
through the engine, as well as a small micro-controller and various cryptographic
accelerator units.
In order to perform a cryptographic operation, the processor will write information into the control registers for the crypto engine, which are usually memorymapped into the address space of the processor. These registers will provide information that tells the crypto engine what addresses to access, what type of cryptographic
algorithm to use, whether to encrypt or decrypt the data, and a variety of other platform specific information. One of the critical pieces of information is which key to
use, and if it is a custom key, where it is located.
In order to make a crypto engine as flexible as possible, designers have typically
provided a set of registers that can contain the key to be used, or instead may contain
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Figure 4.2: Generic cryptographic engine with various cryptographic accelerators

the address of where to find the key. This may not always be the case, and if the same
manufacturer that produced the SoC designs the crypto engine, some key addresses
could be hard-coded into the engine. How each chip handles this is almost always
confidential and can only be obtained through a non-disclosure agreement (NDA), if
at all.
It is assumed that most modern SoC architectures store cryptographic keys in the
eFuse array, or some other memory-mapped non-volatile memory location. eFuses
where initially designed by IBM as a mechanism for enabling or disable functionality
within a SoC [77]. Use cases for eFuse arrays continued to grow and quickly found
their way into mobile security applications. Motorola is rumored to have used them to
block downgrading of the Operating System on Droid devices [78]. Subsequently, chip
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manufacturers have begun o↵ering eFuse arrays as a location for the secure storage
of cryptographic keys [32] [33]. While specifics of which manufacturers are providing
this capability and which OS vendors are utilizing it is difficult to determine, it can
be determined that this is the approach being pushed by a number of manufacturers.
Unfortunately, by storing keys in non-volatile storage, the value of the key becomes susceptible to a variety of attacks, many of which were discussed by Chakraborty [79]. Most of the reasons cited by the author for such attacks are centered
more on the acquisition of intellectual property (IP) rather than keys. However, as
stated by Simons et al. [80], “Tools for attacking hardware have become very advanced, which has decreased the protection provided by storing a key in memory to a
minimum.” Therefore, these keys must be protected from discovery through attacks
like those presented by these two authors.
In order to protect against hardware attacks aimed at key extraction, such as
those mentioned by these two authors, it is necessary to remove the keys from any
form of non-volatile storage. This can be accomplished with PUFs, as shown in
Figure 4.3. The first step is simply adding a PUF to the overall SoC architecture
and connecting the results directly into the cryptographic engine.
When presented with a set of challenges, the PUF generates a set of responses
which are feed into a key generation unit, shown in Figure 4.4. As proven by previously discussed research, these responses should contain random data that is unique
for each device. The random data is used for two purposes: first, as an actual secret
key for symmetric key operations, and second, as random input into an RSA key
pair generation unit. As there are no mathematical constraints on the value of an
AES symmetric key (aside from size), the random data can simply be fed straight
through. On the other hand, RSA key pairs must be related mathematically and
therefore cannot be random data values. Rather, the random data is presented as a
seed for generation of random RSA keys. Since RSA key values are generated based
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Figure 4.3: PUF Enhanced SoC Architecture
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Figure 4.4: PUF Result Key Generator (PRBKG)

upon the value of the seed, the resulting keys will be unique per device.
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Figure 4.5: PUF Enhanced Cryptographic Engine

Once the PUF successfully generates the necessary keys and values, they can be
fed into the crypto engine for access during cryptographic operations. Figure 4.5
shows the resulting architecture from adding the key generation modules into the
generic architecture presented previously. The keys generated for use in this case
must be static, meaning the PUF must always generate the exact same keys every
time it is run. It will likely also be of interest to include key generation functionality
that is based upon random PUF results and could be used sporadically by the device.
The purposes of these random keys will be discussed in greater detail later in this
chapter.
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4.2

Crypto Engine Communication Architecture

A PUF-enhanced cryptographic engine can be integrated into a mobile system to
support secure operations. However, several key considerations must be weighed
in order to achieve the goals of improved system level security. First, any access
methods that might exist that would allow code running on the processor to access
the key must be eliminated. While it would be unusual for a designer to establish
a direct communication mechanism between the processor and the micro-controller
running inside the crypto engine, which does not mean that such an architecture
will never exist. As such, a truly secure cryptographic engine should never make
assumptions about which element it is communicating with and should therefore
restrict all access to critical components.
Therefore, it is proposed that the key value be stored in some form of latched,
volatile memory and fed directly into the corresponding cryptographic accelerators
or muxed with any other key input lines going into the accelerator. The crypto
micro-controller would then only control the mux that feeds the accelerators, rather
than directly supplying the requisite values. In this way, no device or logic unit has
direct access to the generated keys and they are only available when the device is
running. The processor can then utilize these keys in the same method described
previously: through the use of control registers.
As for when the keys are used, it is necessary to first understand their purpose.
The purpose of the secret key is encryption of sensitive information, such as the
TEE. It could also be used to encrypt known good values for MTM functionality, public/private key pairs, DRM authorization information, authentication, and
various other applications which will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3.
However, the use of the device secret keys should be as limited as possible. Instead,
additional keys can be generated and encrypted with the device secret key. Upon
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boot up, these keys can be decrypted and used to protect the majority of sensitive
information, while encryption with the device secret key is disabled. This provides
a dramatically smaller window in which an attacker might attempt to gain access to
the device secret keys.
The public/private pair would be used in conjunction with the secret key for
authentication. Authentication can be used to verify the identity of the mobile
device based upon the processor it’s using, as this is unlikely to change. Instead of
burning a key into the eFuse array, a hash of the network’s public key can be stored
instead. This will allow the device to verify any authentication requests. When the
device is first associated with the network, a simple value exchange can occur, using
the following process:

Alice : C = EApriv (Tnonce + Tchallenge )) + Apub

(4.2.1)

Bob : Tnonce + Tchallenge = DApub (C)

(4.2.2)

Bob : C = EApub (Bpub + EBpriv (Tnonce + EBsecret (Tchallenge )))

(4.2.3)

Alice : Bpub + EBpriv (Tnonce + EBsecret (Tdata )) = DApriv (C)

(4.2.4)

Alice : Tnonce + EBsecret (Tchallenge ) = DBpub (EBpriv (Tnonce + EBsecret (Tchallenge )))
(4.2.5)
Alice : Tresponse = EBsecret (Tchallenge )

(4.2.6)
(4.2.7)

For this example, the two users “Alice” and “Bob” will be used to represent the
network and device respectively. In step 4.2.1, Alice will generate two items, a nonce
and a challenge, and encrypt them using her private key. This information, along
with Alice’s public key, is then sent to Bob. Assuming Bob has a hash of Alice’s public
key stored in some form of non-volatile memory, he can verify the provided key and
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then use it to decrypt the nonce and challenge (step 4.2.2). Bob then encrypts the
challenge using his device secret key, combines it with the nonce, and encrypts them
together using his device private key. Bob combines that with his device public key,
encrypts it all with Alice’s public key, and returns the result to Alice (step 4.2.3).
Finally, Alice can decrypt all of this information, thereby providing her with the
Bob’s public key (step 4.2.4), which can then be used to decrypt the origin nonce
and the result of the challenge issued to Bob (step 4.2.5).
In order for this approach to work, there are a few conditions required in order
to ensure security. First, this transaction must take place over a closed-network
environment. With mobile devices, this could be done by a carrier prior to selling
the device, or be done over hard-wire with the customer. Second, it should be
understood that the nonce and data value being sent over in step 4.2.1 could be
seen by anyone on the network. This value is not meant to be a secret, but rather a
signature generated by Alice. Bob can store the challenge and use it to verify that
any further authentication request do in fact originate from Alice. By adding the
nonce, we eliminate the ability of an attacker to replay this communication or spoof
these values in the future. This exchange of the nonce and data value is consistent
with the challenge/response methodology discussed in Chapter 2.
In addition, the nonce is always encrypted prior to the challenge. The reason for
this is that the nonce should always change, or repeat so infrequently as to make
storage of all values in between infeasible. If the key were placed in front, an attacker
could ascertain when a challenge is being issued, even if they cannot determine the
value of the challenge. This could be somewhat mitigated by making the challenge
longer than the block size when using a block cypher, or by changing the padding
scheme used by a streaming cypher. However, it is simply a better idea to place
the nonce first followed by the challenge, thereby making comparisons of subsequent
cypher-text basically pointless. Further, this transaction should only need to occur
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once, as Alice should be able to use Bob’s public key for any follow-on transactions.
Should the need ever arise, Alice can issue a new challenge to Bob at any time over
a completely encrypted channel.
The primary purpose of this approach is to provide a method of authentication
for the device. Rather than using an approach similar to the ones presented in
previous research e↵orts where a database of challenge/response pairs is maintained,
this methodology requires only a single challenge/response pair to be maintained per
device. In addition, it also provides a simple method for updating this information
should any security compromise occur with regards to the stored data or keys.
From the users’ point of view, it would be impractical to expect them to bring
their device in to an authorized repair facility or to the Information Technologies (IT)
department at work every time a potential security incident occurs. Not only would
such requirements result in personal inconvenience, they could also create significant
support requirements for carriers and/or manufacturers. Therefore, a policy must
exist that allows for the update, modification, or removal of these challenge/response
pair that can be done without direct impact on the user. This approach directly
addresses this need.
Once this initial transaction occurs, subsequent exchanges can be optimized by
removing the need to exchange Alice and Bob’s public key. Instead, Bob can maintain
an encrypted copy of Alice’s public key in some form of non-volatile storage. Each
time a transaction occurs, Bob simply decrypts Alice’s public key using his own secret
key, verifies the hash, and then uses the key as though it were passed in directly from
Alice. This then reduces the exchange requirements, as shown below.
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Alice : C = (EBpub (Tnonce + Tchallenge )

(4.2.8)

Bob : Tnonce + Tchallenge = DBpriv (C)

(4.2.9)

Bob : C = EApub (Tnonce + EBsecret (Tchallenge ))

(4.2.10)

Alice : Tnonce + EBsecret (Tchallenge ) = DApriv (C)

(4.2.11)

Although Alice’s public key is public and disclosure of it should not be considered
a significant security risk, it can provide information to an attacker who might have a
presence on the device. If the attacker is able to simply read a section of memory and
pull out all public keys that are stored by the device, (s)he could ascertain certain
information about whom the device communicates with. Further, an attacker could
modify the key with the public key of another device, thereby allowing the attacker to
spoof the identity of the original device. For these reasons, it is highly recommended
that all association and authentication keys, challenges, and supporting information
be maintained completely encrypted while not in use and removed from memory as
soon as possible after use.

4.3

PUF Generated Key Usage

The previous sections described how it would be possible to leverage a PUF-enhanced
cryptographic engine to produce keys that can be used to perform secure authentication, as well as protecting security sensitive information on mobile devices. The
capabilities provided by such an architecture are critical to the development of a secure system. Although the user is the primary owner of a mobile device after it has
been purchased, the incorporation of these features can greatly reduce the adverse
e↵ect of malicious software on network providers and OS vendors. Additionally, each
feature presented has applicability in all three arenas: network provider, OS vendor,
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and user.
To illustrate exactly how e↵ective this architecture can be at addressing the secure
concerned presented thus far, a number of use cases will be presented. First, it will
be shown how the use of device unique secret key can be used to protect the TEE
during the secure-boot process. Second, an example of how public/private key pairs
can be used to protect and enforce DRM protections on streaming media will be
presented. Finally, a device authentication mechanism aimed at eliminating theft
that utilizes the authentication scheme detailed previously will be discussed.

4.3.1

Use Case: “Secure” Secure-Boot

Throughout this paper the concept of securing the TEE has been mentioned. It is
proposed that the best method for doing this is by incorporating the use of the PUF
enhanced crypto engine with its unique-per-device secret key. The generated secret
key can be used to encrypt the entire TEE as it resides on disk, or to just encrypt
another key that is used to encrypt the TEE. For this reason, it is critical that the
PUF be able to generate a consistent, repeatable value for the device secret key.
A number of approaches have been taken to address this concern, as discussed in
Section 2.3.3. Multiple secret keys can be generated if needed, allowing for redundant
copies in the event that one of the PUFs fails. For the purposes of this research, it
is assumed that the PUF is stable, though contingencies are discussed should they
ever be necessary.
When a device boots for the first time, it is expected that the non-volatile storage
will be empty and no software will be loaded, other than initial boot code located in
the secure-ROM. From here, the first step should be loading a TEE onto the device.
In order to support encryption and protection of the TEE, it is necessary to store
a header at the beginning of the disk, similar to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
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Section
TEE marker
TEE version
TEE SHA-256 hash encrypted
TEE encryption routine
TEE size
O↵set to boot-loader
TEE Manufacturer
Padding

Size
4 Bytes
4 Bytes
20 Bytes
4 Bytes
8 Bytes
8 Bytes
80 Bytes
384 Bytes

Table 4.1: Example TEE header

used on many desktop systems. This header contains all the information necessary
to identify the location of, and then decrypt, the TEE. An example of such a header
is shown in Table 4.1.
The example header shown provides a number of fields that can be used to store
information about the TEE. For the decryption process, the critical pieces of information are the encryption routine used and the SHA-256 hash of the decrypted TEE.
The identification of the algorithm allows for future changes, though it is expected
that this will always be some form of AES. The hash value is used to verify that the
TEE was not maliciously altered at any time and represents a hash of the decrypted
TEE, not the encrypted version.
The header also contains a number of fields that can be used to provide information about the TEE and who manufactured it. The o↵set field provides information
on where the TEE resides on disk, and the size field contains the size of the encrypted
TEE. All other fields are for manufacturer identification and backward compatibility
support, assuming manufacturers will produce multiple versions of their TEE over
the years.
Once the TEE has been located, decrypted, and verified, execution can be passed
to the TEE and the boot process can continue. The inclusion of this mechanism
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Figure 4.6: TEE boot process options

results in the boot process shown in Figure 4.6. As illustrated in this figure, the first
step in the process is decrypting the TEE header. This should be done using the
device secret key. If a TEE is identified, it is then decrypted, measured, and verified,
and then executed. If no TEE is found on disk, a check should be performed to
determine if a TEE was ever loaded onto the device. This can be done using a
single eFuses bit. The eFuse bit should be enabled initially until a TEE is loaded
for the first time. Once the TEE is loaded, the fuse can be blown. If the fuse is
blown, if not TEE is found or if the TEE verification process fails, the device will
not boot. Manufacturers may also allow for non-secure execution, though this will
be implementation specific.
To protect against “bricking” the device in the event that a flash disk fails or the
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TEE is inadvertently modified, manufacturers can upload a new TEE to the device.
The process should be similar to what is done when the TEE is initially loaded. For
optimal security, this process should require authentication of any device attempting
to upload a new TEE. The process described in Section 4.2 would work perfectly for
this issue.
It is important to note that this approach does not prevent the alteration of the
TEE; instead, it intentionally allows the TEE to be updated. This is possible because
the header that identifies the TEE only contains a SHA-256 hash of the decrypted
TEE. In order to update the TEE, the new TEE sent to the device, encrypted using
the device secret key, written to disk, and a new hash is generated and stored at
the proper location in the TEE header. The ability to perform an update must be
controlled via the TEE or the secure-ROM, which must both include functionality
for verifying the authenticity of any TEE updates received. This architecture merely
allows such an update to occur, while prohibiting an attacker from removing the
TEE and booting in a non-secure fashion, nor modifying the TEE and overwriting
the hash.
For this to work, both the TEE and the crypto engine will require enhanced
support and greater API functionality. From the TEE perspective, it must include
mechanisms for communicating with the crypto engine, performing updates, and
restricting access to critical information in memory. The crypto engine must not
ever assume that the entity using it is functioning properly and therefore must not
allow arbitrary usage of either the secret key or the private key. How this can be
handled will be addressed in Section 4.4.
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4.3.2

Use Case: DRM Protection

Digital Rights Management, or DRM, is a term for the collection of protection mechanisms used by various digital media companies to protect media from copyright
infringement and unauthorized usage. DRM incorporates a variety of di↵erent protection mechanisms and is used to protect a variety of electronic media from video
games to streaming video. Rather than attempting to address how this technology
could help each DRM technology available, the use case discussed here is a single specific technology. In this section, it will be shown how a protocol called FairPlay such
could be enhanced with the PUF enhanced crypto engine. The FairPlay protocol is
used extensively by Apple, Inc. [81].
FairPlay is a DRM protection mechanism used and developed by Apple to protect
audio and video media. The protocol calls for the encryption of an audio/video
stream of each file with a “master” key that is stored encrypted within the metadata
for the file. Each time a user downloads a file, a random “user” key is generated and
used to encrypt the master key. FairPlay servers maintain a list of user keys assigned
to each user and download this information to client applications for each authorized
machine. The client application then maintains this information in its own internal
key repository. Whenever a user wants to play a file, the application pulls the user
key from its key repository, decrypts the master key, and then uses it to decrypt the
audio/video stream.
Although Apple stopped using FairPlay in 2009 for audio tracks, it continues to
use this technology for videos purchased or rented on various devices. However, in
the words of Steve Jobs,
“The problem, of course, is that there are many smart people in the
world, some with a lot of time on their hands, who love to discover such
secrets and publish a way for everyone to get free (and stolen) music.
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They are often successful in doing just that, so any company trying to
protect content using a DRM must frequently update it with new and
harder to discover secrets. It is a cat-and-mouse game.’ ’ [82]

Steve was correct about hackers breaking DRM, and FairPlay was no exception.
Various groups and individuals were able to reverse engineer iTunes and discover
methods for obtaining the master keys used to protect files, as well as intercepting
the unencrypted traffic delivered to sound cards [81].
In addition to security issues related to the DRM protection scheme, FairPlay
and Apple have both received a lot of backlash from consumers about the process
of “authorizing” their devices. For instance, Apple restricts the number of authorize
devices per account, currently set at five. Additionally, problems have arisen from
the need to have an Internet connection available in order to authorize a device to
play protected media. Even if a device is authorized with iTunes and almost has
music purchased with the correct account, if the key for each file is not in the iTunes
key repository, the device will not play the respective file. So the question is, how
can DRM be used in a way that is not inhibited by network connectivity and that
is not so restrictive on device usage?
In order to make the most of the capabilities provided by the ECE, an update is
required to the mechanism for associating devices with FairPlay compatible accounts.
Consider a simplified UML model of a FairPlay account stored on a FairPlay Server
and a user device, as shown in Fig 4.7. These models show the necessary information
and functions that are used by each entity to support this relationship. In addition,
each has zero or more associated keys and media files.
Now, let us consider how a device would associate itself with a FairPlay server.
The first step is to generate a random secret key that can be used to encrypt the
“master” key for any media purchased via this device. This key, along with the
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Key:
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(a) FairPlay Account

Key
Key Number:
Key Value:

(b) User Device

Figure 4.7: Simplified UML models of a FairPlay account and user device.

account information and whatever FairPlay currently uses as the unique identifier, are
sent to the FairPlay server. The FairPlay server then verifies the account information
and determines if there are any device slots available for the account. If so, the secret
key provided is added to the account. The FairPlay server then returns to the device
all secret keys currently associated with the account. These keys are then stored on
the device and encrypted using the device’s secret key. This process is illustrated in
Figure 4.8.
Most of the steps in this process should be fairly straightforward and easy to
understand. However, the purpose behind sending each device all the secret keys
associated with the account might appear somewhat suspicious. The reason for
doing this is simple: by allowing all devices to know the secret key used by all other
devices on the account, each device can play any supported media file, regardless of
where it was purchased and how it was transferred to the device. As long as the
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Fairplay Server

User Device
Generate random secret
key and encrypt with
device secret key
Send secret key, unique
ID, and FairPlay account
info to server

Verify account info and
available device slot,
then record key
Return keys for all
currently registered
devices.
Encrypt and store all
keys registered with
account.

Figure 4.8: Device association with FairPlay servers

device has been registered with the FairPlay account, it will have access to all keys
used to encrypt any media files belonging to the account. Additionally, there is no
inherent risk to the overall security of the device if these keys are exposed as they
are only used to protect media files and nothing else.
If a device ever needs to be removed from the account, whether due to security
issues or because it is no longer being used, the FairPlay servers simply need to go
through the account and change the Key and KeyNumber attributes for each media
file that was purchased by that devices. If the account maintains a “primary device”,
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its key can be used to re-encrypt the master key and then the KeyNumber value can
be set to that key. If there are no other devices on the account, the key can be
reset to the master key and stay that way until a new device is associated with the
account.
This technique can also be used support movie rentals where not only is there
data encryption to consider, but also a timeframe. For instance, most movies rented
through the Apple iTunes store or Amazon are only valid for 24 hours from the time
it was rented. But what happens if during that time the user wants to watch the
video on a di↵erent device, but doesn’t have Internet access in order to authorize
such a transaction? There is currently no mechanism for transferring a rental movie
from one device to another. There is now.
By maintaining a list of keys for all devices on an account on each device, the
capability exists to transfer files between devices and maintain the ability to play
them. All information about the movie, including expiration time, can be secured
on the initial device through the device’s iTunes secret key. If a user wants to move
the movie to another device, all it needs to do is transfer the file. Because each of
the devices have all the keys, each will be able to decrypt a file meant for any other
device on the account. Once on the new device, the new device can decrypt the
information and play the movie using the appropriate account key.
The “key” here is that any device on the account can transfer a protected file to
any other device without needing to determine whether or not it is associated with
the same account. Because the information needed to play the file is encrypted, the
only way another device could play the file is if it was already registered with the
FairPlay account and had the full list of keys associated with the account. The only
information necessary needed by an associated device in order to decrypt the file is
which of the keys was used to encrypt the data. This could easily be stored in the
file metadata, as shown in Fig 4.7, or it could use a simple trial-and-error approach
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wherein the device tries decrypting the file with each account key until it finds the
one the correctly decrypts the data.
As can be seen from these DRM examples, this architecture provides the capability of providing significantly enhanced functionality and security. The primary
advantage that this approach provides is in the ability to provide unique and protected keys that can be easily changed when needed without significant impact on a
user’s ability to access their files. Further, it provides a means of securely transferring files between multiple devices associated with the same FairPlay account that
does not infringe on any copyright policies. DRM is a “cat-and-mouse” game and it
is not expected that this will be a definitive security solution to the problems faced
by DRM. However, this approach does provide significant benefits over any know
approach used today.

4.3.3

Use Case: Deterring Theft

The final use case being presented details how this architecture can assist in deterring
theft of mobile devices. The currently proposed approach is to use International
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers to uniquely identify mobile devices. This
should not be confused with the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
number, which is usually stored within a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card.
The IMSI is used to associate the user with the network, while the IMEI is used to
associate the device with the network. However, there is currently no mechanism for
associating the user with the device, and both together with the network.
In addition to this lack of functionality, the usage of the IMEI number has not
been as e↵ective as was originally hoped. The first problem revolves around the fact
that even if the device is reported as stolen and the IMEI is known, the device may
only be placed on a blacklist for a specific carrier. This means a thief only needs to
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take the device to a di↵erent carrier in order to use it. While many devices may be
“locked” to a specific carrier, or carrier frequency rather, there almost always exist
tools for “unlocking” these devices in order to allow them to work on any carrier.
Further, many countries don’t even use black-lists thereby creating hot spots for
thieves to buy and sell mobile devices.
Second, if the IMEI number is read and returned via software running on the
device, the number can never be trusted to be accurate. If the OS has been hacked,
the user can hard-code any value (s)he wants and thereby make the device appear
to have a di↵erent number. Without any reliable verification mechanism, there is no
method available to determine from the carrier end whether or not the real IMEI
was returned or a spoofed version generated by some arbitrary code.
And finally, because this value is often stored in a programmable, non-volatile
memory location, such as an eFuse array, they can be modified. If a device manufacturer has the capability of programming this area after manufacturing, a hacker will
likely have the capability as well. This often requires nothing more than re-soldering
a few connections and then having the necessary programming equipment. Such alterations are typically illegal, but then so is theft, so that’s often of little consequence
to a thief.
To best understand how an ECE can help address these problems, it is necessary
to understand exactly how a mobile device user is authenticated with a cellular
network. For this example, a Global System for Mobile computing, or GSM, network
will be considered.
The first time a user attempts to connect to the network with their device, it
sends the IMSI number to the network. The network verifies this IMSI number
and a new number is generated, called the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
(TMSI). From this point on, the device uses this number to associate itself with the
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Figure 4.9: Device authentication on GSM networks

network rather than the IMEI. This is illustrated in Fig 4.9.
Each network also contains an Authentication Center (AC) that handles the
association of devices with the network. Both the SIM card and the AC have access
to a user authentication code and mathematical algorithm that are used in this
process. To initiate the association, the AC sends a random number to the mobile
device. This random number, along with the user code, is fed into the algorithm on
the SIM card of the device. The AC also performs the exact same operation. Once
the device completes the operation, it returns the response to the AC. The AC can
then compare the device’s result with its own and verify that they are the same. If
so, the device is authenticated. Otherwise, the device is considered “unknown” and
is denied access to the network.
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While the ECE is not meant to provide any enhanced security to the communications channel between the device and the base station, it is important to see how
this authentication works. Figure 4.10 shows more detail about how this is done.
Using a shared key, Ki , which is programmed into the SIM card, the random number
is run through the A3 algorithm on both sides. This results in a Signed RESponse
(SRES) that is transmitted back to the base station to prove the authenticity of the
device. The result is also feed into the A8 algorithm in order to create a session
key, Kc . (The A3 and A8 algorithms are key-dependent, one-way hashes that today
have been combined into what is known as the COMP128 algorithm) This key is
then used to encrypt/decrypt all traffic between the device and the network. This
approach is e↵ective in that it allows encryption of traffic without ever having to
transmit the key between element, but it should be noted that these algorithms and
Device
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Generate random
number for challenge
RAND

RAND

A3 Algorithm
SRES

Ki
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A3 Algorithm
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Figure 4.10: Cryptographic operations during the authentication process
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Figure 4.11: Example internal communication flow during network authentication

the keys involved can typically be broken anywhere between a few minutes (A5) to
a few hours (A3 and A8) [83].
It is also important to understand exactly how these operations are performed
on the device, as well as how the data is handled. As shown in Fig 4.11, the random number generated by the cellular network is received at the modem and then
transmitted to the main processor. Once the main CPU receives the request, it is
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forwarded on to the SIM card along with the random number that was received.
The SIM card then sends the random number, plus the user authentication number,
through the appropriate algorithm and generates the response. This response is then
returned to the CPU, which then passes it along to the modem for broadcast to the
cellular network.
Once the device is authenticated, the AC will periodically send out requests for
the IMEI number of the device. The process for generating a request is similar to
the cellular authentication process, except that the CPU, not the SIM card, provides
the IMEI value. The reason for this is that the IMEI number is typically not stored
inside the SIM card. Instead, it is likely stored in an eFuse array, which is internal
to the processor and thus inaccessible to the SIM card.
The primary security concern in each of these communication processes is the
fact that everything is channeled through the main CPU which means that whatever
software is running on the CPU has the ability to manufacture whatever value it
wants. What this means is that any form of malicious code could manufacture a
bogus value for the IMEI number rather than the actual value stored on the chip.
While it would be unusual for an attacker to interfere with the initial authentication
mechanism (since they likely want the device connected to the cellular network), there
is certainly reason to alter the results of an IMEI request. As mentioned previously,
if a thief or attacker wanted to bypass blacklisting functionality, they need only
intercept these requests and change the value returned for the IMEI number.
To counter the problem of IMEI spoofing or tampering, as well as to protect
against theft, the ECE can be used to provide a simple solution. For authentication
with the cellular network, a challenge/response test can be issued once a secure
channel has been established between the device and the cellular network. The
challenge/response test would utilize the device secret key to encrypt a challenge
value and then return the response. This approach would require the least changes
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in existing cellular network protocols. However, a better method would be for the
mobile device to provide the cellular network with its device public key. It could then
sign the response provided to the CPU in Step 3 of Figure 4.11 and return it with
the response. The cellular network could then verify the signature with the device’s
public key, thereby providing authentication information on the user and the device
simultaneously.
In regards to IMEI spoofing, the ECE can also provide a random number that
would take the place of the IMEI number and would also be inaccessible to the
processor. The difficulty with this is having the processor acknowledge and response
to the IMEI request, but not be able to manipulate the value. Unfortunately, there
is no easy method for doing this. However, modern SoC designs provide a solution.
In addition to the main processor, most cellular devices have an additional processor called the baseband processor (BBP). This processor, also known as the modem,
handles the cellular communications into and out of the mobile device. As such, it
has the capability to identify authentication and IMEI request from the cellular network. Using its own PUF to generate a random, unique-per-device value, the BBP
could provide an identification value for the mobile device that could be used in place
of the IMEI number. By doing so, the main processor, or Application Processor as
it is often called, has no control over the value returned during IMEI requests, nor
would the cellular network have any idea the number was generated by the BBP
rather than the application processor.
The solutions presented here provide two critical points. First, the ECE can
be used by the application processor to counter theft in mobile devices. Second,
the ECE has potential uses in more than just the application processor. While the
identification of additional elements that can utilize an ECE is a subject for further
research, it is important to note that even on a mobile processor, benefits can be
gained by implementation on multiple elements.
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4.4

Enhanced Crypto Engine API

In order for the Enhanced Cryptographic Engine (ECE) to be of use to the mobile
device, it is necessary to provide an Application Programming Interface (API) that
will allow the unit and its associated functionality to be accessible to developers.
The API proposed in this section consists of a small number of functions providing
the necessary interface, as well as enums and #defines to generate parameter values.
The complete API header file is shown in Appendix A.
While the API does provide the functionality to support increased mobile security, it is the usage implementation, requirements, and restrictions that provide the
enhanced security capabilities discussed thus far. In this section, the functions defined by the API will be presented. After discussing these functions, the next section
will discuss the restrictions and requirements that must be met in order to ensure the
highest level of security on the mobile device. In Chapter 5, a complete implementation will be presented that shows an example of a software API that implements
all the specified functionality and does so in accordance with all listed requirements
and restrictions.

4.4.1

ECE API Functions

Although the API functions may be accessed for a number of di↵erent purposes, it is
easiest to consider their use in one of four di↵erent operational modes in which the
processor may be executing. These modes are illustrated in Fig. 4.12. As shown,
the processor can be in one of four di↵erent operating modes: Uninitialized mode,
TEE Loading mode, Discovery mode, or Standard mode. During execution within
each of these modes, the processor has specific responsibilities that require certain
interactions with the ECE. To depict the functionality provided by the API, each
mode will be considered independently.
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Figure 4.12: Operational modes of a mobile architecture using an enhanced cryptographic engine

Uninitialized Mode

A device enters the uninitialized mode when no TEE has been loaded into memory,
or when a corrupted TEE has been detected. This will be the case when the device is
turned on for the first time, or whenever a problem has occurred during the attempted
boot of the TEE. Prior to loading a TEE onto the device, or executing an existing
TEE, it is necessary to generate the AES secret key and the RSA key-pair from the
PUF results inside the ECE. To support this need, two functions are necessary to
instruct the ECE to generate the needed keys:
Once these two functions have been called from the SecureROM code on the device, the processor can move to the next mode. Because the TEE header is encrypted
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using the device secret key, it is necessary to enable access to this key prior to moving
to the next mode.
Listing 4.1: Uninitialized Mode Functions
ERROR_CODE ECE_Generate_Secret_Key( void );
ERROR_CODE ECE_Generate_RSA_Key_Pair( void );

TEE Loading Mode
With the device-unique key loaded and accessible, the next step is discovery and
verification of the TEE. Discovery of an existing TEE is handled via the process
outlined in Figure 4.6. Using an approach similar to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
used in desktop systems, the TEE header should be located at the beginning of the
first sector of the disk. If no TEE is present, it will first be necessary to upload a
TEE onto the system before continuing execution. The ability to scan for and load
a TEE can be handled with one function, and the ability to load a new TEE and
generate the corresponding header can be handled with another. These two functions
are:
Listing 4.2: TEE Loading Mode Functions
ERROR_CODE ECE_TEE_Verification( uint32_t * load_address );
ERROR_CODE ECE_TEE_Initialization( void );

The first function, ECE TEE Verification, is used to scan for an existing TEE
and then decrypt and load it at a specified address. Before the TEE header can be
analyzed, it must first be decrypted using the device secret key. Once decrypted,
the header provides all necessary information about the TEE in order to verify its
integrity and to load the TEE into memory prior to execution.
The ECE TEE Initialization function is used for loading an initial TEE onto an
internal storage device, as well as providing updates to an existing TEE. This function
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must therefore support the use of one or more communication protocols for uploading
the TEE to the device. Which protocols are supported is platform dependent and is
not dictated by this API. Once a TEE has been uploaded or modified, this function
then invokes ECE TEE Verification to begin execution of the new TEE.
Additional functions are necessary to facilitate the cryptographic operations necessary to decrypt or encrypt the TEE and its header. The functions provided must
also support access to the device secret key. To meet this need, two more functions
are included that allow code to encrypt or decrypt data using a variety of modes and
customized features. These functions are:

Listing 4.3: Crypto Loading Mode Functions
ERROR_CODE ECE_AES_Crypto( uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output, uint32_t length, uint32_t op_type, uint8_t *key,
uint8_t *iv );
ERROR_CODE ECE_RSA_Crytpo( uint8_t *input, uint8_t *output, uint32_t length, uint32_t op_type, uint8_t *key );

Each function contains an op type parameter that is used to define specific information about the respective operation, such as key size, encryption or decryption,
and algorithm selection. A full listing of possible values is shown in Appendix A and
is based o↵ the open source OpenSSL library. This portion of the API is platform
dependent and may include fewer, more, or the same number of options. The lack of
a desired implementation in the provided API does not correlate to a lack of functionality in the design. Designers have full liberty to modify the provided API in
any manner that fits their needs.
After the TEE has been loaded and begun execution, there are two possible modes
into which the system may move. The Discovery’ mode is used when it is necessary
to associate one device with another device through the exchange of public keys.
The other supported mode is called Standard mode and provides all other generic
capabilities and interfaces to the ECE. The Discovery mode will be considered next.
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Discovery Mode
Discovery mode is a special mode that allows for the exchange of public keys between
two devices. Once in Discovery mode, a mobile device may issue a discovery request
to another device, or it may received a discover request from another device. The
required parameters for a discovery request consist of an address and an interface
method, i.e. communication protocol. The device then issues a request using this
information and exchanges keys using the algorithm defined in Section 4.2.
Discovery mode also supports the ability to authenticate a mobile device with
a cellular network, Wi-Fi network, or any other necessary device or infrastructure.
This authentication method includes the ability to associate a device with a user
during authentication with a cellular network, as discussed in Section 4.3.3.
To support the ability to association and authenticate a device, five additional
functions are needed. These functions are shown below.
Listing 4.4: Discovery Mode Functions
ERROR_CODE ECE_Device_Authentication( uint8_t *key, uint32_t method, uint8_t *address );
ERROR_CODE ECE_Device_Association( uint32_t method, uint8_t *address );
ERROR_CODE ECE_Device_Disassociation( uint32_t method, uint32_t *address );
uint8_t * ECE_AES_Keygen( void );
uint8_t * ECE_RSA_Keygen( void );

The first function, ECE Device Authentication, is used to verify the identity of
a connecting device. Once in discovery mode, the function ECE Device Association
is used to association with a given device. The function ECE Device Disassociation
is used to remove a previously recorded association with another device. The last
two functions, ECE AES Keygen and ECE RSA- Keygen, are used by both devices
to generate a public/private key pair and a shared secret key that may be used
to facilitate secure communications between the two devices. Once all discovery
operations have been performed, the system moves into Standard mode.
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Standard Mode
Standard mode is where the device will spend most of its time. This mode is predominately concerned with the protection of data and information controlled by both the
REE and the TEE. The TEE should not rely upon TZ protections alone to protect
access to sensitive information, but should instead generate keys for encryption of
such information. The REE can also utilize key generation capabilities to protect its
data and information, as well as to support standard cryptographic operations, such
as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Support of this functionality requires additional methods, though it may still
utilize some of the functions previously listed, like ECE AES Keygen. The additional
functions provided are shown below.
Listing 4.5: Standard Mode Functions
ERROR_CODE ECE_Change_Secret_Key( void );
ERROR_CODE ECE_Change_RSA_Key_Pair( void );

The last two functions provided are ECE Change Secret Key and ECE ChangeRSA Key Pair. These functions are used to change the primary keys used by the
device. This may be done at any time if it is believed that the device has potentially
been compromised. Performing this operation is a fairly simple and straightforward
procedure. The TEE is the only element that is encrypted with the device secret
key. Therefore, it must be decrypted prior to changing the key and then re-encrypted
after a new key has been generated.
To update the RSA key pair, a command must be sent to any authenticated
network alerting the appropriate entity of the expected change. Once a new key
pair is generated, a new challenge/response exchange can be initiated in order to
re-authenticate the device with the network. This can be done by following the same
procedure that was performed initially to authenticate the device. As long as the
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network is expecting this change, it is possible to initiate this update in a secure
fashion.

4.4.2

ECE API Restrictions and Requirements

True security in almost any application does not come in the features that are provided, but in the restrictions and requirements for utilizing the provided functionality.
The ECE is no exception. While the use of the ECE will likely vary from one implementation to another, there are a few critical rules that must be met completely
in all applications. Other restrictions and requirements are flexible based upon the
implementation and platform details for the design. This should not be mistaken as
meaning that the restrictions and requirements could be ignored. Rather, this means
that some platforms may wish to adhere to them in one way, while it would be more
logical to do so in a di↵erent manner on another platform. Similar to the previous
section, it will be easiest to consider these restrictions and requirements by looking
at the four modes of operation.
The uninitialized mode is where the device keys are generated. The functionality
provided by this mode must only be available during the first stage of boot. At no
other time should any code be able to regenerate the device keys. At a later stage
access to these keys must be disabled. Therefore it is absolutely critical that the
functionality to regenerate these keys not be available at any other stage. Otherwise, an attacker could potentially gain access to the ECE and perform arbitrary
encryption and decryption of device critical data with the device secret key, allowing
them the ability to modify or remove the data.
The TEE Loading mode provides the mechanisms necessary to modify and upload
a TEE to the device. Because the TEE will be responsible for controlling access to
the ECE, it is critical that the TEE be properly verified and tested prior to use. All
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TEEs must be signed before being uploaded to the device. A public key must be used
to verify the signature for the TEE prior to loading it onto disk. To accommodate this
need, a hash of the key must be stored on the device. The recommended location
is the onboard eFuse array. In the case that an eFuse array is not available, the
hash can also be stored in an unused section of the SecureROM. If neither of these
two components is available, any other form of non-volatile, one-time programmable
memory can be used. Developers may also choose to store the entire public key on
the device rather than the hash. This is an acceptable alternative, but will likely
restrict the number of suitable locations due to the size of a public key.
The TEE loading mode must also only be entered prior to loading of any existing
TEE. A TEE may be partitioned between the trusted kernel and trusted applications.
If such partitioning were done, it would be acceptable to allow for the uploading of
new trusted applications or the updating of existing applications from within the
TEE kernel while operating in Standard mode. However, the TEE kernel itself must
never be updated at any time other than during the TEE Loading mode. This ensures
that the proper verification of any provided update is performed prior to accepting
the changes. While the TEE may initiate the update process while running in the
Standard mode, the update must only be performed in TEE Loading mode prior to
execution of the TEE. This ensures that even if an attacker were to gain execution
within the TEE, (s)he cannot upload an arbitrary TEE update to the device. This
is critical since the TEE is not re-verified after beginning executed. If an attacker is
able to modify the TEE after it has been loaded into memory, there is not mechanism
for detection. Therefore, even the TEE has an element of untrustworthiness of which
must be accounted.
Discovery mode is the most highly implementation dependent mode. This is
primarily due to the fact that the need to associate with other devices, as well as
the method of association, is very implementation dependent. Regardless of the
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implementation, discovery mode must rely upon a trusted entity to approve its use.
For a large number of devices, this can be achieved via user interactions. In other
instances, user interaction is not possible and the trusted entity must be provided in
another fashion. In either case, device association must be instituted via the TEE
running in Standard mode. However, the association must only occur in Discovery
mode. Therefore, if the device is running in Standard mode and an association is
requested, the device must reboot into Discovery mode. A direct transition from
Standard mode back to Discovery mode is not allowed. This requirement is in place
for the same reason that was presented for TEE updating. An attacker must not be
provided with the ability to arbitrarily associate or disassociate with other devices.
Another reason that discovery must only be performed while in Discovery mode
is that the device secret key must be disabled prior to leaving Discovery mode and
entering Standard mode. At this point, the TEE header and TEE have been decrypted and the TEE is running. The only remaining use for the device secret key
is decryption of stored association information. A device will always enter discovery
mode even if it is only to check for existing association information. After existing
association information is decrypted, the device secret key must be un-latched. During Uninitialized mode, the ECE latches the PUF generated keys into registers so
they can be accessed. These latches should be cleared once the association information is decrypted, thereby prohibiting access to the device secret keys. The device
public/private key pair can still be enabled as they are used primarily for continual
authentication purposes and do not provide protection of any device critical data.
In regards to how discovery it initiated, the simplest case is that association
is only performed as needed by the user and with the user’s permission. In other
situations, such as automotive networks, discovery mode can be initiated via an
external mechanism. In automotive systems, the On-Board Network (OBD) interface
can be used to facilitate communications between computer systems. Networked

103

Chapter 4. ECE Architecture
devices can store the public key or key-hash internally for the manufacturer of the
automobile. An external device can be pre-loaded with the manufacturer’s private
key and connected to the OBD network. This device can then send a command
to each computer instructing it to enter discovery mode. This command must be
signed using the private key, thereby allowing each networked computer to verify the
authenticity of the command prior to transitioning to Standard mode. Once every
internal computer has associated with all other computers, the external device then
broadcasts an “end-association” command that tells each device to leave Discovery
mode and enter Standard mode.
While such an approach might be appropriate for automotive networks, it is not
recommended for standard user operated devices. User operated devices must always
obtain user permission prior to entering Discovery mode. In the event a user is not
available, some trust mechanism must be established prior to allowing any device
to put another device into Discovery mode, such as the one presented previously.
Although the exact approach presented here is not required, the secure establishment
of trust between the two devices is, however that may be accomplished.
As stated before, once in Standard mode, access to the device secret key must be
disabled. The TEE may continue to utilize the ECE to generate other secret keys
in order to form a key-chain for encryption of other security sensitive data values.
At this point, the majority of restrictions and requirements will be the responsibility
of the TEE developer. Aside from access to the device secret key, all other ECE
functions should be available. The functions for changing the device secret keys
must also only initiate the action, rather than perform them. As with the transition
to Discovery mode and the modification of the TEE, this must be performed at
an earlier level. In this case, changing of the device secret keys must take place
from with code executing out of the SecureROM. Any commands needed to support
the changing of the private key can occur outside the SecureROM code since such
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modem and/or baseband processor support is typically not available here. However,
the actual command to change the key must occur only in the SecureROM code.
The ECE contains a small amount of non-volatile memory that can maintain
helper data for identifying viable PUF circuits for use in generating these keys. By
changing which PUF circuits are used, the resulting keys can be changed. The new
circuit information is stored as helper data within the non-volatile memory. The use
of helper data does not provide any information about the key itself, as discussed in
Section 2.3.3. After changing the helper data, the device will then have a new secret
key that can be used to protect the TEE.
It is expected that the functionality to change the device secret key will be maintained within the TEE, though the request to do so will likely come from code
executing within the REE. To provide the highest degree of assurance that the request is valid, the REE must be measured and verified prior to accepting any such
requests. Further, the user must be prompted from the TEE, not the REE, for approval of such an action. All ECE requests that necessitate user interaction must be
performed via the TEE, not the REE. This provides the highest level of confidence
that such requests come from a trusted source. Additionally, all requests that require user approval must include a cool-down timer. If an attacker was able to gain
access inside the TEE, (s)he must not be allowed to continually change the key as it
might be possible for them to eventually guess the right value. It is recommended
that a cool-down time of 24 hours be used, though shorter periods may be used if
necessary. It is highly recommended that no time period shorter than one hour be
used. Where possible, the timer should be placed inside the ECE and not the TEE.
If an attacker has gained execution within the TEE, they would likely be able to
bypass any internal cool-down timers.
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Implementation and Results
In Chapter 4, the ECE architecture was presented, along with a collection of use
cases that can benefit from the functionality provided by the ECE. While a full
hardware implementation of the ECE would be ideal, the purpose of this research
is to prove the feasibility of this approach and determine any weaknesses that may
exist or any changes that might strengthen its security. Further, complications with
hardware platforms that would support such an architecture have made a hardware
implementation impractical at this time.
In order to overcome the limitation presented by not having a viable hardware
platform, while still providing solid results on the e↵ectiveness of this architecture,
a software emulator of the ECE has been developed. In this chapter, the structure
of this emulator will be discussed and a number of test cases that were conducted
with the emulator will be presented. The test cases include protection of a TEE and
association between a number of devices. Details about the API presented in Section
4.4 and how the functions were implemented in this emulator will also be covered.
In conclusion, this chapter will present the results discovered through the use of
this software emulator and how they a↵ect the proposed architecture and security
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approach.

5.1

ECE Software Emulator Architecture

The software emulator consists of two executables: ece emulator and tee client. As
discussed in Section 4.4 and shown in Fig. 4.12, the ECE is accessed by a processor running in one of four execution modes. These four execution modes are
split between these two applications. The ece emulator handles the Uninitialized
and TEE Initialization modes, while the tee client handles Discovery and Standard
modes. This was done because logically the first two modes happen outside of any
TEE on the device, while the last two modes are either handled or invoked by the
TEE. While the tee client is not meant to emulate a fully compliant GlobalPlatform TEE, it does contain all the necessary functionality to support the ECE API
functions that must exist within a TEE. Both applications utilize the OpenSSL library [84] in order to implement cryptographic operations, such as key generation
and encryption and decryption routines.
To better understand how these two applications work together to emulate the
ECE and its corresponding software API, consider the execution flow of the eceemulator shown in Fig. 5.1. When the ece emulator application is started, it is
provided with a command line argument that represents the name of an ECE disk
file. An ECE disk file is a 128MB file that is used to emulate a simple flash chip on
a mobile device. This file maintains several items that are necessary for the proper
functionality of the ece emulator application. The size of this file is completely
arbitrary, with 128MB being chosen because it is large enough to store a significant
amount of test data while not taking an excessive amount of disk space on any
modern desktop computer. The ECE disk file is also mapped into memory when
used by the ece emulator, so that was a factor in its size as well.
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ece_emulator

Does ECE disk
exist?

No

Initialize new ECE
disk

Yes

Does TEE exist
on disk?

No

Install new TEE into
ECE disk

Yes
Spawn TEE as new
process

Open localhost
network socket for
receiving TEE
requests

Figure 5.1: Operational flow of ece emulator application.

The ECE disk file starts with a header that identifies the files as containing a
valid ECE format. The header used is shown in Table 5.1. This header contains all
information necessary to initialize the ECE environment. Because OpenSSL is not
setup to generate the same key each time its key generation functions are called, it is
necessary to store the secret keys inside the ECE disk file after they are generated.
This allows the application to maintain the same secret keys across multiple runs
and represents the only significant deviance from the actual ECE architecture.
This portion of execution represents the Unitialized mode. The first time the program is run, the ECE disk file will not exist. The program therefore initializes a new
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Section
ECE marker
ECE header size
ECE section size
O↵set to secret AES key
O↵set to secret RSA key pair
O↵set to TEE header
Padding

Size
4 Bytes
4 Bytes
4 Bytes
8 Bytes
8 Bytes
8 Bytes
476 Bytes

Table 5.1: ECE disk header

disk file and generates the necessary device secret keys using the ECE Generate Secret Key and ECE Generate RSA Key Pair functions, as shown in Figure 5.2. Initialization consists of creating the file, expanding it, generating the keys, writing
them to the file, and then writing the ECE header to file. Memory mapping is not
absolutely necessary, but rather makes access to the header and corresponding data

ECE Error Code E C E G e n e r a t e S e c r e t K e y ( )
key < RAND bytes ( 32 ) ;
i v < RAND bytes ( 16 ) ;
ECE Error Code ECE Generate RSA Key Pair ( )
k e y P a i r < R S A g e n e r a t e k e y ( s i z e , exponent , NULL, NULL ) ;
ECE Error Code E C E I n i t i a l i z e N e w D i s k ( diskName )
i f ( diskName d o e s not e x i s t )
C r e a t e F i l e ( diskName ) ;
E x p a n d F i l e S i z e ( diskName , 128 ⇤ 1024 ⇤ 1024 ) ;
data = MapFileToMemory ( diskName ) ;
deviceAESKey = E C E G e n e r a t e S e c r e t K e y ( ) ;
deviceRSAKeyPair = ECE Generate RSA Secret Key Pair ( ) ;
hdr = ECE Generate ECE Header ( deviceAESKey , deviceRSAKeyPair ) ;
ECE Write AES Key To File ( data , deviceAESKey ) ;
ECE Write RSA Key Pair To File ( data , deviceRSAKeyPair ) ;
ECE Write ECE Header To File ( data , hdr ) ;
else
data = MapFileToMemory ( diskName ) ;
hdr = ECE Read ECE Header From File ( deviceAESKey , deviceRSAKeyPair ) ;
deviceAESKey = E C E R e a d S e c r e t K e y F r o m F i l e ( ) ;
deviceRSAKeyPair = ECE Read RSA Secret Key Pair From File ( ) ;

Figure 5.2: ECE disk initialization
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easier. If the disk file already exists, the header and keys need to be read from the
file.
In addition to the secret key information, the ECE header also provides information about the location of the TEE header. In a standard ECE implementation, the
ECE header will not exist and the TEE header will be located at the first sector of
the disk. However, due to the need to maintain key information, the TEE is located
at a di↵erent location in the ECE disk file.
Once the ece emulator has verified and parsed the information contained in the
ECE header, it moves on to the next operational mode. In the TEE Loading mode,
the ece emulator is responsible for implementing the ECE TEE Verification and
ECE TEE Initialization functions by utilizing the ECE AES Crypto and ECE RSACrypto routines. If the disk file is brand new, a new TEE will need to be loaded. For

i n t 3 2 t ECE AES Crypto ( i n p u t , output , l e n g t h , o p t y p e , key , i v )
EVP CIPHER CTX init ( cryptCTX ) ;
EVP CIPHER CTX set padding ( cryptCTX , 0 ) ;
a l g o r i t h m = ECE Get AES Algorithm ( o p t y p e ) ;
i f ( op type i s encrypt )
E V P E n c r y p t I n i t e x ( cryptCTX , a l g o r i t h m , NULL, key , i v ) ;
EVP EncryptUpdate ( cryptCTX , output , b y t e s E n c r y p t e d , i n p u t , l e n g t h ) ;
EVP EncryptFinal ex ( cryptCTX , ou tp ut+b y t e s E n c r y p t e d , b y t e s E n c r y p t e d ) ;
return bytesEncrypted ;
else
E V P D e c r y p t I n i t e x ( cryptCTX , a l g o r i t h m , NULL, key , i v ) ;
EVP DecryptUpdate ( cryptCTX , output , b y t e s D e c r y p t e d , i n p u t , l e n g t h ) ;
EVP DecryptFinal ex ( cryptCTX , ou tp ut+b y t e s D e c r y p t e d , b y t e s D e c r y p t e d ) ;
return bytesDecrypted ;
i n t 3 2 t ECE RSA Crypto ( i n p u t , output , l e n g t h , o p t y p e , key )
padding = RSA PKCS1 OAEP PADDING ;
i f ( op type i s encrypt )
b y t e s E n c r y p t e d = R S A p u b l i c e n c r y p t ( l e n g t h , i n p u t , output , k e y P a i r ,
padding ) ;
return bytesEncrypted ;
else
b y t e s D e c r y p t e d = R S A p r i v a t e d e c r y p t ( l e n g t h , i n p u t , output , k e y P a i r ,
padding ) ;
return bytesDecrypted ;

Figure 5.3: ECE AES and RSA crypto operations
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ECE Error Code E C E T E E I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( t e e F i l e N a m e )
teeHdr = ECE Generate Blank Header ( ) ;
E C E F i l l T E E M a n u f a c t u r e r I n f o ( teeHdr ) ;
t e e D a t a = ECE Read TEE Executable ( t e e F i l e N a m e ) ;
i f ( ECE Verify Signature ( teeData ) < 0 )
r e t u r n ECE ERROR;
teeHdr >hash = ECE SHA 256 ( t e e D a t a ) ;
teeHdr >r o u t i n e = AES 256 CBC ;
teeHdr >s i z e = ECE AES Crypto ( teeData , encData , f i l e S i z e , e n c y r y p t ,
secretKey , secretIV ) ;
memcpy ( teeHdr + teeHdr >o f f s e t } , teeData , teeHdr >s i z e ) ;
ECE AES Crypto ( teeHdr , encHdr , t e e H d r S i z e , e n c r y p t , s e c r e t K e y , s e c r e t I V ) ;
memcpy ( teeHdr , encHdr , t e e H d r S i z e ) ;
ECE Error Code E C E T E E V e r i f i c a t i o n ( d i s k D a t a )
i f ( ECE Does TEE Header Exist ( d i s k D a t a ) == FALSE )
i f ( ECE TEE Initialization ( diskData ) < 0 )
r e t u r n ECE ERROR;
t e e D a t a = ECE Read TEE Header ( d i s k D a t a ) ;
i f ( ECE Verify TEE Header ( t e e D a t a ) < 0 )
r e t u r n ECE ERROR;
ECE Execute TEE ( t e e D a t a ) ;

Figure 5.4: TEE initialization and verification

the emulator, this is the tee client executable. Initialization consists of reading in
the tee client executable, encrypting it using the device secret key, and then writing
it to disk. Additionally, a TEE header must be created based upon file attributes
for the tee client file, such as size. This header must also be encrypted prior to
storing it in the ECE disk file. The complete pseudo code for the ECE AES Crypto
and ECE RSA Crypto functions are shown in Figure 5.3 and the TEE functions are
shown in Figure 5.4.
Although OpenSSL provides a significant number of functions and features that
make this emulator possible, it is important to note that there is no RSA private encrypt and RSA public decrypt functions. Or rather, there are none that function
the same as the converse functions. The RSA private encrypt function is really a
signature generation function as opposed to a function that will actually encrypt a
specified string of data with a private key. The same is true for public decryption.
Fortunately this was only slightly limiting and is not a problem that should occur
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Figure 5.5: Execution flow of TEE client application

with regular cryptographic engines, as they typically have no method for detecting
whether the key being used is the public or private key.
After both applications have been started, it is necessary to provide a communications mechanism in order for the tee client to request certain operations by the
ece emulator. To facilitate this need, the ece emulator opens a localhost only network socket that can be used by the tee client to make requests. Once this port is
open, the ece emulator awaits connections and then services any requests as they
arrive. Supported requests include en(de)cryption with the secret AES and RSA
keys, AES and RSA key generation, and changing of the AES and RSA secret keys.
The tee client has a more complex execution flow, as it has to listen for commands
locally from the user, as well as from remote locations. Additionally, it must be able
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to initiate requests to remote devices as requested by the user. The full execution
flow for the tee client is shown in Fig. 5.5.
Execution starts by first looking for an existing association file inside the ECE
disk file. Anytime an association is made with another device, there is a collection
of values that must be stored in order to open a secure communication channel
with an associated device. To support the storage of association information, the
header shown in Table 5.2 is used. This header maintains all necessary association
information. For the RSA keys, both the public and private local keys are stored.
Although the local public key should never be used after it is transmitted to the
associated device, it was decided to simply maintain it. This was mostly because
the OpenSSL function PEM write bio RSAPrivateKey, which is used to write the
private key to a bu↵er, actually writes out both the public and private keys. Rather
than hacking OpenSSL to only write the private key, it was determined to simply
maintain both as doing so results in no serious security risk to the emulator.
In Discovery mode, the tee client supports all of the necessary functionality to
support association and authentication. In the case of the ece emulator, the gen-

Section
associationTag
headerLength
totalLength
addressType
associationAddress
o↵setToLocalAESKey
localAESKeyLength
o↵setToLocalRSAKeys
localRSAKeysLength
o↵setToRemoteRSAKey
remoteRSAKeyLength

Size
4 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes
20 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes
4 bytes

Table 5.2: Device association header
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TEE Error Code T E E A s s o c i a t i o n R e q u e s t ( re m o te A d d re ss )
i f ( u s e r d o e s not approved )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
r s a K e y s = ECE RSA Keygen ( ) ;
aesKey = ECE AES Keygen ( ) ;
nonce = Read Random Data ( ) ;
c h a l l e n g e = nonce + SHA 256 Hash ( l o c a l A d d r e s s , remo teA d d ress ) ;
p a c k e t = ECE RSA Crypto ( c h a l l e n g e , e n c C h a l l e n g e , s t r l e n ( c h a l l e n g e ) , e n c r y p t
, rsaKeys >p r i v a t e ) ;
p a c k e t = p a c k e t + rsaKeys >p u b l i c ;
S e n d R e q u e s t ( packet , re m ot e A d d re ss ) ;
Get Response ( r e s p o n s e ) ;
i f response < 0
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
d e c R e s p o n s e = TEE Decrypt Response ( r e s p o n s e ) ;
remoteKey = decResponse >pubKey ;
c h a l l e n g e = decResponse >c h a l l e n g e ;
T E E W r i t e A s s o c i a t i o n T o F i l e ( remoteAddress , c h a l l e n g e , aesKey , rsaKeys ,
remoteKey ) ;
r e t u r n TEE SUCCESS ;
TEE Error Code T E E A s s o c i a t i o n R e s p o n s e ( c l i e n t A d d r e s s )
r e q u e s t = G e t R e q u e st ( ) ;
i f ( u s e r d o e s not approve r e q u e s t from c l i e n t A d d r e s s )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
rsaKey = ECE RSA Keygen ( ) ;
ECE RSA Crypto ( r e q u e s t >data , decReq , s t r l e n ( r e q u e s t >data ) , d e c r y p t ,
r e q u e s t >pubKey ) ;
c h a l l e n g e = SHA 256 HASH ( l o c a l A d d r e s s , c l i e n t A d d r e s s ) ;
i f ( c h a l l e n g e not same a s decReq >c h a l l e n g e )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
ECE AES Crypto ( c h a l l e n g e , e n c C h a l l e n g e , l e n g t h , e n c r y p t , s e c r e t K e y ,
secretIV ) ;
ECE RSA Crypto ( e n c C h a l l e n g e + r e q u e s t >nonce , encPacket , l e n g t h , e n c r y p t ,
rsaKey >p r i v a t e ) ;
ECE RSA Crypto ( e n c P a c k e t + rsaKey >p u b l i c , encResponse , l e n g t h , e n c r y p t ,
r e q u e s t >pubKey ) ;
SendResponse ( e n c R e s p o n s e ) ;
T E E W r i t e A s s o c i a t i o n T o F i l e ( c l i e n t A d d r e s s , decReq >c h a l l e n g e , decReq >
aesKey , rsaKey , decReq >pubKey ) ;
r e t u r n TEE SUCCESS ;
TEE Error Code T E E D i s a s s o c i a t i o n ( r e m o t e A dd r e s s )
i f ( u s e r d o e s not approved )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR:
i f ( a s s o c i a t i o n d o e s not e x i s t f o r r e m ot e A d d r e s s )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
T E E R e m o v e A s s o c i a t i o n F r o m F i l e ( r em o t e A d d re s s ) ;
r e t u r n TEE SUCCESS ;

Figure 5.6: TEE association and disassociation

eration of AES and RSA keys are identical to what was shown in Figure 5.2 for
generating the device secret keys. The only di↵erence is that these keys are not
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stored in the ECE disk file. Instead, the ece emulator calls the same functions and
then returns the resulting keys over the network connection. For this reason, the
pseudo code for these functions is not included. The pseudo code for the association
function is shown in Figure 5.6. Because the authentication function operates in
virtually the exact same manner, it is not included. It is important to note that
functionality for association is split in two routines: one routine for making a request, and another routine for receiving a request. Authentication does not require
two functions, as a mobile device should never request authentication; only a network
should initiate such a procedure. Associated devices may use their stored challenge
values as part of subsequent interactions to prove their identities and therefore have
no need for an independent authentication routine.
Once all associations are retrieved, the tee client sends a command to the ece emulator to disable use of the device secret key. To protect the key from being
accessed directly by the tee client, the ece emulator program is run with root privileges and spawns the tee client as a standard user application. The TEE disk file that
is created by ece emulator is therefore only accessible by root, so tee client has no
ability to access the file and read the key values. Since the ece emulator application
is run as root and opens a network port, a closed-network is highly recommended
for any testing. Associated security risks should be mitigated by the fact that the
connection accepts localhost connections only, but that opens the system up to malicious local applications. However, the purpose of doing this was to attempt to
emulate the same protective environment that would exist on a mobile device. Both
programs could also be run as a standard user and the claim could be made that
the tee client is assumed safe and would never attempt to access the key. Either
approach is viable.
The tee client also opens a network socket that may be used to receive requests
from external devices. The tee client monitors this connection for available clients.

115

Chapter 5. Implementation and Results

TEE Error Code TEE Change Secret Key ( )
i f ( u s e r d o e s not approve )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
decTee = ECE AES Crypto ( t e e , l e n g t h , d e c r y p t , s e c r e t K e y , s e c r e t I V ) ;
d e c A s s o c i a t i o n s = ECE AES Crypto ( a s s o c i a t i o n s , l e n g t h , d e c r y p t , s e c r e t K e y ,
secretIV ) ;
ECE Change Secret Key ( ) ;
a s s o c i a t i o n s = ECE AES Crypto ( d e c A s s o c i a t i o n s , l e n g t h , e n c r y p t , s e c r e t K e y ,
secretIV ) ;
t e e = ECE AES Crypto ( decTee , l e n g t h , e n c r y p t , s e c r e t K e y , s e c r e t I V ) ;
ECE Write Associations ( a s s o c i a t i o n s ) ;
ECE TEE Initialize ( tee ) ;
TEE Error Code TEE Change RSA Key Pair ( )
i f ( u s e r d o e s not approve )
r e t u r n TEE ERROR;
DeauthenticateWithNetwork ( ) ;
ECE Change RSA Key Pair ( ) ;
AuthenticateWithNetwork ( ) ;

Figure 5.7: TEE secret key and key pair change

If a request has been made, it must be determined if this request requires interactions with the ece emulator. For instance, association requests require generation of
a new public/private RSA key pair and AES key, as well as encryption services during the transaction. Therefore, if communication is needed with the ece emulator,
a connection is made and the request(s) is issued. Other requests may require a
connection to a remote device, such as an association request made locally. In this
case, a connection must be opened to the remote device and the request issued. All
association requests, whether received locally or remotely, require user approval in
order to proceed.
After all remote requests have been serviced, the tee client next looks for local
request made via the command line. A user is able to issue local commands to the
tee client and may also provide input for certain requests that have been received.
Anytime a remote device requests an association, the user must approve the transaction, as mentioned previously. The user can also issue the command to change the
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secret keys, disassociate with a device, or generate a new key. The pseudo code for
changing the secret keys is shown in Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.8: ECE disk header and AES key in ECE disk file
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Figure 5.9: RSA key in ECE disk file

5.2

ECE Software Emulator Results

Using the pseudo code presented in the previous section as a basis, a full software
emulator was developed and tested using three desktop devices. These devices included a 2012 Apple Macbook Pro laptop, a VMware virtual machine running 64-bit
Ubuntu 12.04 Server, and a custom desktop with a quad-core AMD processor running 64-bit Ubuntu 11.10. Since timing analysis and overhead from cryptographic
operations is highly implementation dependent and not the focus of this research, a
detailed listing of the specifications for each desktop device is not included. Instead,
the results focus on the implementation of the proposed API.
The first test conducted was the generation of ECE disk files along with the
encryption and storage of a TEE executable. This was performed on all three devices
using a natively compiled tee client application as the TEE. The disk files generated
contain an ECE header, along with the AES and RSA keys (Figure 5.8 and Figure
5.9), and the TEE header (Figure 5.10).
Next, it was necessary to prove that the secret key generated by each desktop
device was unique and that the code properly encrypted each TEE. To show this, an
entropy test was performed on the TEE section of each corresponding ECE disk file.
The entropy results are shown in Table 5.3, which provides the entropy measurement,
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Figure 5.10: TEE header and encrypted TEE in ECE disk file

File Size (bytes)
Entropy
Arithmetic Mean
Serial Correlation Coe↵

Laptop
1266096
7.999867
127.4433
0.001216%

VM
1333920
7.999876
127.4774
-0.000163%

Desktop
1339392
7.999831
127.3839
-0.000036%

Optimal
N/A
8.0
127.5
0.0

Table 5.3: Entropy measures of platform specific, encrypted TEE

the arithmetic mean, and the serial correlation coefficient.
The entropy measurement is for each bit in a bytes. As there are eight bits in a
bytes, the optimal value would be eight. The arithmetic mean is the average value of
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each byte in the file. Since bytes can contain values between 0 and 255, the median
value is 127.5. Thus, the optimal arithmetic mean is 127.5. The serial correlation
coefficient refers to the e↵ect that the value of one byte will have on the subsequent
byte. For encrypted or compressed data, the optimal value is zero. As shown in
this table, each of the encrypted TEE sections are very close to the optimal values
for their respective measurements. However, this is to be excepted since the data
is encrypted using AES-256, which is known to produce data with such randomness
values.
An additional item to note from Table 5.3 is the fact that the TEE file sizes
are not identical. This is because the TEE for each device was compiled natively.
Because each desktop device has a di↵erent version of the GCC compiler, and was
compiled against a di↵erent kernel source, the resulting TEEs vary in size. To further
prove that the device keys are unique, the same TEE was provided to each device

Figure 5.11: Transmission of TEE association request header
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Figure 5.12: Transmission of public key of initiating device

and then encrypted and stored inside the ECE disk file. The TEE sections were then
extracted and compared with one another to determine if there was any correlation
between to values of each byte in the encrypted TEE files. This test also resulted in
a correlation of nearly zero, as expected.
In addition to test on the randomness of the TEE, the full functionality of the
software emulator was tested to ensure proper execution of the API functions. Each
test conducted produced successful results. While it is difficult to quantify success
for many of these features, a collection of network packet captures were generated
that show a full association between two devices, followed by the transmission of a
file encrypted using the public keys exchanged during the association.
The first step of the association is illustrated in Figure 5.11. In this step, the
association request is sent to the remote device. All request and responses start with
a 12 bytes header that contains the command, the header size, and the data size.
Once the header is transmitted, the corresponding data is relayed. In this case, the
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Figure 5.13: Transmission of TEE association response header

Figure 5.14: Transmission of public key of remote device
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Figure 5.15: Transmission of TEE association request

data is the public key of the initiating device, as shown in Figure 5.12. Once the
key is received and the remote device has obtained approval for the association to
proceed, a response is returned, shown in Figure 5.13. After the response header
is transmitted, the public key of the remote device is transmitted, as depicted in
Figure 5.14. While the public key of the remote device would normally be encrypted
using the public key of the initiating device, the key was instead transmitted in the
clear in order to more easily illustrate what is being sent during each step. A version
that is fully compliant with the association algorithm presented previously has been
developed and was tested to ensure proper operation.
After completing the association, an additional function was added to the ECE
API that supported transmission of data files between two associated devices. This
functionality was developed to prove to capability of this technology to provide a
secure communication channel between two devices. This technique addresses the
protection of DRM material that could be exchanged between devices registered with
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Figure 5.16: Transmission of TEE association request

Figure 5.17: Transmission of TEE association request
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a FairPlay account, as detailed in Section 4.3.2.
As shown in Figure 5.15, the file transfer starts with the transmission of a request
header. This header identifies this request as a file transmission request, provides a
header length of 12 bytes, and a data length of 1266112. If this file size is compared
with the TEE files listed in Table 5.3, it may be noted that this file is only 16 bytes
larger than the TEE compiled on the MacBook Pro. In fact, that is the file being
transferred in this example. The additional 16 bytes are the result of padding during
the AES algorithm. Figure 5.16 shows the beginning of the transmission of the
encrypted TEE file. The transmission of the file is then completed and a response
header is generated and returned by the remote device, as illustrated in Figure 5.17.

5.3

ECE API Implementation Results

Although it is difficult to illustrate the full functionality of this software emulator
through figures and tables, the examples provided demonstrated each of the capabilities necessary to support the use cases presented in Chapter 4. The randomness
values presented on the encrypted TEE files show the ability of this tool to uniquely
protect a TEE resident on a mobile device, a need addressed in Section 4.3.1. Additionally, the use of the TEE header provides the functionality to support updates,
authorized modifications, and additions to the TEE. The association performed illustrates how multiple devices can exchange device keys and authentication information,
thereby allowing the device to uniquely authenticate itself not only to other device,
but also to a network. This capability addresses the need for stronger authentication
presented in Section 4.3.3. The association mechanism also facilitates the ability to
securely transfer information between multiple devices, which can lead to the transfer of DRM protected materials between di↵erent devices on an account, per Section
4.3.2.
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The results in this section have proven the strength of the ECE in addressing
some of the most critical needs in the world of mobile security. The API presented
provides all the functionality need to support authentication, secure communications,
and unique protection of system critical code and data values. Incorporation of this
architecture into any mobile framework will greatly enhance its ability to provide
reliable mobile security that is far ahead of anything currently on the market today.
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Conclusions
Mobile security is a complex and ever changing research area. As detailed in Section
2, there are an immense number of solutions, specifications, protocols, and methodologies available which attempt to address a variety of areas in the realm of mobile
security. These various implementations cover security related issues from device
manufacturing all the way to communications and device interactions. As evidenced
by the amount of research being done on mobile devices, this is definitely a growing
area that will continue to face a number of challenges with its incredible growth.
The research presented in this paper was conducted first with a desire to understand all of the many security related research areas dealing with mobile devices.
Once a solid pool of knowledge was generated, the research transitioned into a discovery process of how PUF technology might be leveraged to address some of the
most pressing issues facing users, developers, cellular provides, and a host of other
players. Does PUF technology provide any features or capabilities that are not already available? If so, could they be used to enhance current security technologies
to provide greater protection of data and communications?
Over the course of conducting this research, these questions were answered. This
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has been accomplished by first conducting an in-depth analysis of modern mobile
security technologies has been presented. Additionally, a novel new architecture has
been proposed for providing enhanced security on mobile devices. The use of PUFs
to generate unique-per-device keys is a substantial finding that provides researchers
with a unique opportunity to strengthen mobile security in a way never done before.
The API provided gives software developer a new set of tools for combating cyber
crime in ways never before imagined. The findings of this research have shown that
PUF technology can not only aid, but can greatly enhance, the mobile security world.

6.1

Additional Research

The results shown as a result of this research have proven that PUF technology has
the required features and abilities to aid in the creation of significantly more secure
mobile devices. This research has also lead to the discovery of a number of additional
topics for further research. For instance, homes are starting to become more and more
advanced with cellular accessible security devices, smart appliances, and remotely
controlled environmental systems. Automobiles are also starting to come stock with
3G and 4G compatible computer systems that are able to monitor vehicle conditions,
provide real-time traffic information, download media files for viewing on internal
entertainment systems, and an array of other electronic enhancements. While one
area of automotive security was addressed earlier, there are still many other areas
that must be researched and may benefit from the capabilities provided by an ECE
architecture.
Additional research can also be conducted in the same areas presented thus far.
Although currently available hardware platforms have made a full hardware solution
impractical at this time, this is a step that still must be performed. The software
emulator discussed was the right first step, but it is not the only step necessary. As
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mentioned previously, Xilinx has created a new FPGA platform with an embedded
dual-core ARM processor called Zynq. Although a bug currently prohibits access to
the TrustZone secure world, and thus the cryptographic unit, a promised fix may
provide researchers with a viable platform for testing of a full hardware implementation [85].
As additional research areas are explored, it may also be discovered that the
ECE architecture provides additional benefits beyond those discussed herein. As
mentioned in Section 4.3.3, processors like the baseband processor may also find a
use for an ECE in device authentication, secure cellular communication, or for a
full on-board authentication mechanism, such as the architecture described in [48].
While a determination of every possible application for the ECE is not possible
without years of additional research, it has been shown through this research that
PUF-enhanced cryptographic engines can be used for dramatically increased security.

6.2

Future of Mobile Security

In an almost constant “tug-of-war” battle, mobile security researchers attempt to
counter attacks made by black-hat and white-hat hackers alike. Software security
researchers are aided in their e↵orts by new hardware security features that are added
to SoC designs with nearly every revision. The inevitability of new features is driven
by an equally powerful certainty: their defeat.
Attackers will continue to find methods for circumventing, or out-right breaking,
the latest and greatest security metric developed. The results of such exploits will
continue to be accompanied with an ever increasing price tag, both in terms of
financial lose and development time for updates. In a recent article, Christopher
Soghoian describe the security issues with Android as being, ”..like a really dry
forest, and it’s just waiting for a match [86].” As such, security researchers can no
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longer a↵ord to wait around for current methods to be broken before developing
enhanced security methods.
While developers may claim that current approaches are sufficient, this ideology
has never worked in the past and will never work in the future. Current security
simply is not sufficient. Use of the ECE architecture presented will allow device
manufacturers and security researchers to take a significant leap forward in their
battle against cyber criminals and hack-tivist. It does not provide an all-power,
never to be defeated solution, but it has the potential to put us in the drivers seat
with the foot on the gas!
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Enhanced Cryptographic Engine
API
#ifndef _ece_interface_h
#define _ece_interface_h
typedef enum aes_op_type {
AES_128_CBC

= 0x00,

AES_128_CFB

= 0x01,

AES_128_CFB1

= 0x02,

AES_128_CFB8

= 0x03,

AES_128_ECB

= 0x04,

AES_128_OFB

= 0x05,

AES_192_CBC

= 0x06,

AES_192_CFB

= 0x07,

AES_192_CFB1

= 0x08,

AES_192_CFB8

= 0x09,

AES_192_ECB

= 0x0A,

AES_192_OFB

= 0x0B,

AES_256_CBC

= 0x0C,

AES_256_CFB

= 0x0D,

AES_256_CFB1

= 0x0E,

AES_256_CFB8

= 0x0F,

AES_256_ECB

= 0x10,

AES_256_OFB

= 0x11,

AES128

= 0x12,

AES192

= 0x13,

AES256

= 0x14,

} aes_op_type;
typedef enum aes_key_size {
AES_KEY_SIZE_128

= 0x0100;

AES_KEY_SIZE_192

= 0x0200;

AES_KEY_SIZE_256

= 0x0300;
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} aes_key_size;
typedef enum rsa_op_type {
RSA_STANDARD

= 0x0,

RSA_NO_PADDING

= 0x2,

RSA_SSL2_PADDING

= 0x1,

RSA_PKCS1_1_5_PADDING

= 0x3,

RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING

= 0x4,

} rsa_op_type;
typedef enum rsa_key_size {
RSA_KEY_SIZE_1024

= 0x0000,

RSA_KEY_SIZE_2048

= 0x0100,

RSA_KEY_SIZE_4096

= 0x0200,

} rsa_key_size;
typedef enum rsa_block_size {
RSA_BLOCK_SIZE_1024

= 0x0000,

RSA_BLOCK_SIZE_2048

= 0x0100,

RSA_BLOCK_SIZE_4096

= 0x0200,

} rsa_block_size;
typedef enum crypto_key_type {
CRYPTO_KEY_AES_INTERNAL

= 0x000000;

CRYPTO_KEY_AES_CUSTOM

= 0x100000;

CRYPTO_KEY_RSA_INTERNAL

= 0x200000;

CRYPTO_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC_INTERNAL

= 0x300000;

CRYPTO_KEY_RSA_PRIVATE_INTERNAL = 0x400000;
CRYPTO_KEY_RSA_PUBLIC_CUSTOM

= 0x500000;

CRYPTO_KEY_RSA_PRIVATE_CUSTOM

= 0x600000;

} crypto_key_type;
typedef enum crypto_method {
CRYPTO_ENCRYPT

= 0x00000000,

CRYPTO_DECRYPT

= 0x80000000,

CRYPTO_GENERATE = 0xC0000000,
} crypto_method;
typedef enum association_method {
ASSOCIATION_WIFI

= 0x0;

ASSOCIATION_BLUETOOTH

= 0x1;

ASSOCIATION_USB

= 0x2;

ASSOCIATION_NFC

= 0x3;

}

/* Function: ECE_AES_CRYPTO
Parameters: input - pointer to a buffer containing the data to be processed
output - pointer to a buffer inwhich to store the result
length - number of bytes to process
op_type - number representing the requested AES operation, keysize, key type, and crypto method
key - pointer to a buffer containing the key to be used, if applicable
iv - pointer to a buffer containing the iv to be used, if applicable
Result:
int32_t, 0 representing success; otherwise negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is provide the capability of performing and AES operation using
either a custom key or the internal secret key.
*/
int32_t ECE_AES_CRYPTO( uint8_t *input,
uint8_t *output,
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uint32_t length,
uint32_t op_type,
uint8_t *key,
uint8_t *iv );

/* Function: ECE_RSA_CRYPTO
Parameters: input - pointer to a buffer containing the data to be processed
output - pointer to a buffer inwhich to store the result
length - number of bytes to process
op_type - number representing the requested RSA operation, keysize, key type, and crypto method
key - pointer to a buffer containing the key to be used, if applicable
Result:
int32_t, 0 representing success; otherwise negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is provide the capability of performing an RSA operation using either
a custom key or the internal secret key.
*/
int32_t ECE_RSA_CRYPTO( uint8_t *input,
uint8_t *output,
uint32_t length,
uint32_t op_type,
uint8_t *key );

/* Function: ECE_AES_KEYGEN
Parameters: key_size - value representing the size of the AES key to generate
Result:
uint8_t *, a pointer to a valid key; otherwise NULL
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to provide a mechanism for generating ad-hoc AES keys that can be
used for protection of communications or system data.
*/
uint8_t * ECE_AES_KEYGEN( uint32_t key_size );

/* Function: ECE_RSA_KEYGEN
Parameters:
key_size - value representing the size of the RSA keys to generate
Result:
uint8_t **, a pointer to a valid public/private key-pair; otherwise NULL
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to provide a mechanism for generating ad-hoc RSA key pairs that
can be used for protection of communications or system data.
*/
uint8_t ** ECE_RSA_CRYPTO( uint32_t key_type );

/* Function: ECE_DEVICE_AUTHENTICATION
Parameters: key - the proposed public key of the device being authenticated
method - the protocol used to authenticate
address - the address of the device requesting authentication
Result:
int32_t, 0 representing success; otherwise a negative value representing error authentication
response for the device. This will result in a direct exchange of information with an onboard SE, such
as the SIM card. No information is passed to this call as control of this functionality should mostly
exist outside the device.
*/
int32_t ECE_DEVICE_AUTHENTICATION( uint8_t *key,
uint32_t method,
uint8_t *address );

/* Function: ECE_DEVICE_ASSOCIATION
Parameters: device_address - address of device with which to associate
Result:
int32_t, 0 representing success; otherwise a negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to provide a method for associating, i.e. exchanging public keys,
with another device. This can happen over any supported communications interface, which may be an added
parameter in later versions. This method will fail if the system is not in "discovery" mode.
*/
int32_t ECE_DEVICE_ASSOCIATION( uint32_t method,
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uint8_t *device_address );

/* Function: ECE_DEVICE_ASSOCIATION
Parameters: device_address - address of device with which to associate
Result:
int32_t, 0 representing success; otherwise a negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to provide a method for associating, i.e. exchanging public keys,
with another device. This can happen over any supported communications interface, which may be an added
parameter in later versions. This method will fail if the system is not in "discovery" mode.
*/
int32_t ECE_DEVICE_DISASSOCIATION( uint32_t method,
uint8_t *device_address );

/* Function: ECE_TEE_VERIFICATION
Parameters: load_address - address at which to load the decrypted TEE
Result:
int32_t, 0 representing success; otherwise a negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to verify that a TEE exist and to decrypt it from memory and load
it into the provided address. This is done by looking for a TEE header at a predefined address. If the
header exist, its information will be used to decrypt the TEE and then load it into memory. If not, an
error is returned.
*/
int32_t ECE_TEE_VERIFICATION( uint32_t *load_address );

/* Function: ECE_TEE_INITIALIZATION
Parameters: None
Result:
int32_t, 0 represents success; otherwise a negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to initialize a TEE environment. When the system boots for the
first time, no firmware or TEE will typically be loaded. This function will accept a new TEE, encrypt it
at the correct location, and then generate a corresponding TEE header that may be used to boot the TEE.
*/
int32_t ECE_TEE_INITIALIZATION( void );

/* Function: ECE_GENERATE_SECRET_KEY
Parameters: None
Result:
uint8_t *, pointer to the location of the new secret key
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to instruct the cryptographic unit to generate the system secret
key by executing the PUF and storing the result. This is done to ensure that the key is not loaded
automatically in case access to the secureROM is somehow bypassed. Operations with the system secret
keys should only be granted when the system is in a known "good" state.
*/
uint8_t * ECE_GENERATE_SECRET_KEY( void );

/* Function: ECE_GENERATE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
Parameters: None
Result:
uint8_t *, pointer to the location of the new RSA key pair
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to instruct the cryptographic unit to generate the system RSA key
pair by executing the PUF and storing the result. This is done to ensure that the key is not loaded
automatically in case access to the secureROM is somehow bypassed. Operations with the system secret
keys should only be granted when the system is in a known "good" state.
*/
uint8_t * ECE_GENERATE_RSA_KEY_PAIR( void );

/* Function: ECE_CHANGE_SECRET_KEY
Parameters: None
Result:
int32_t, 0 represents success; otherwise a negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to provide a mechanism for changing the system AES secret key in
the event of suspected disclosure of the current key, or simply as a precautionary measure on a periodic
basis.
*/
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int32_t ECE_CHANGE_SECRET_KEY( void );

/* Function: ECE_CHANGE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
Parameters: None
Result:
int32_t, 0 represents success; otherwise a negative value representing error
Purpose:
The purpose of this function is to provide a mechanism for changing the system RSA key pair in the
event of suspected disclosure of the current keys, or simply as a precautionary measure on a periodic
basis.
*/
int32_t ECE_CHANGE_RSA_KEY_PAIR( void );
#endif
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